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Preface 
This study analyses options to improve the division of labour between the various donors of 
the European Union: the European Commission and the Member States. It was commissioned 
by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development (BMZ). How-
ever, it is the responsibility of the German Development Institute (DIE) alone and any conclu-
sions should not be attributed to BMZ. 
The study is part of a research project on division of labour in EU development co-operation 
of DIE, the Centre of International Relations at the University of Ljubljana and the Centre of 
African and Development Studies at the Technical University of Lisbon. Case studies on the 
possible roles of the New Member States and Portugal in a division of labour will be pub-
lished in another DIE discussion paper. 
The results of this research project were presented in January 2007 in Brussels as an academic 
contribution to the ongoing political discussion about a division of labour in EU development 
co-operation. 
 
Holger Mürle Bonn, February 2007 
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Executive summary 
In October 2006, the General Affairs and External Relations Council of the European Union 
(EU) adopted “guiding principles” for a division of labour in EU development co-operation 
and stated its intention to define concrete steps to operationalise them. Based on an analysis of 
relevant concepts and existing experiences, the present study develops concrete proposals 
how these principles could be implemented.  
Why we need a division of labour between donors 
To improve the division of labour between donors is a core challenge for the effectiveness of 
development co-operation. Because of the high transaction costs of co-ordinating and harmo-
nising a large number of donors, the Paris Declaration can only become a success if a division 
of labour is implemented. Too many donors are concentrating on the same countries and the 
same sectors. This problem is particularly relevant in countries which receive high amounts of 
official development assistance (ODA) in relation to their gross national income (GNI).  
The role of the EU for improving the division of labour between donors 
Ownership of the partner countries is crucial for any division of labour in development co-
operation. However, it is the responsibility of donors to make proposals how to better organ-
ise themselves and thus expand the choices of the partner countries. Because the EU accounts 
for more than half of worldwide ODA, includes 15 of the 22 bilateral donors organised in the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and has established institutions for joint decision-
making, it could become an engine for a donor-wide division of labour. Progress towards a 
better internal division of labour would increase the visibility and the political influence of the 
EU in international development co-operation. Any EU initiative for a division of labour 
should be open and aim at the largest possible participation of other donors. In addition, it 
should take account of the substantial differences between donors. Every EU donor has spe-
cific expertise and can play an active role in a division of labour. 
Core principles for a division of labour 
1. The main goal of a division of labour is to reduce the number of donors involved in the 
same kind of activities. 
2. While it may take time to change the current patterns of aid delivery, a division of labour 
should be applied immediately to additional development assistance. 
3. Each donor should build on its particular strengths rather than build new competences in 
areas where other donors already show good performance. While the EU as a whole should be 
able to provide all forms of thematic, sectoral and instrumental development operations and 
be active globally, individual donors may specialise in a co-ordinated way on specific coun-
tries, themes, sectors and instruments.  
4. A division of labour is not a technical exercise of maximising aid effectiveness according 
to an objective formula, but must take account of the political processes of development co-
operation, involving value-judgements, interests and negotiations. 
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5. A division of labour should find a pragmatic balance between a pluralism of different ap-
proaches and a reduction of the number of donors focussing on the same countries and sec-
tors.  
6. In the future, the currently limited knowledge about comparative advantage could be im-
proved through comparative evaluations of donor performance. 
7. In-country, cross-country and cross-sector division of labour are linked. They should be 
addressed simultaneously, as progress in one dimension is limited by progress in the other 
dimensions. A reduction of the overlap of EU donors in the cross-country and cross-sector 
dimension would simplify and facilitate in-country processes of division of labour. 
8. In order to move beyond policy statements and achieve real changes in the practice of de-
velopment co-operation, the EU should define concrete activities in all three dimensions of a 
division of labour and monitor their implementation. 
How to improve in-country division of labour 
Because of the ongoing processes of formulating donor-wide joint assistance strategies and 
the introduction of EU joint programming, there is a window of opportunity for improving in-
country division of labour. However, progress in reducing the number of donors has been 
slow so far. The EU should advance division of labour exercises as part of these processes by 
applying good practices specified in a code of conduct:  
— limit the number of sectors per donor;  
— limit the number of donors active in a sector;  
— use lead donor arrangements for sector policy dialogue and donor co-ordination; 
— use delegated co-operation outside focal sectors as a tool for quickly moving towards a 
division of labour. 
The EU should select a number of countries where these principles can be applied immedi-
ately and monitor the experiences with the implementation of the code of conduct. 
How to improve cross-country division of labour 
The EU should improve cross-country division of labour through three complementary initia-
tives: 
1. Each EU donor should individually assess its current degree of geographic concentration by 
benchmarking against other donors of similar size. As the choice of partner countries is highly 
political, this assessment is mainly a national task. However, the individual reviews should be 
accompanied by an exchange of views on good practices and a discussion about the appropri-
ate level of concentration. If a EU donor decides to reduce the number of priority countries, a 
consultation with the other EU donors should take place about their planned presence and 
allocation as well as about the overall aid level in the countries concerned. Thus, an unin-
tended fall in the overall aid level of a country (possibly leading to new “orphans”) can be 
avoided. 
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2. EU donors should develop a joint strategy for the limited number of cases in which there is 
substantial overlap in their choice of partner countries. There are about 30 EU “darling” coun-
tries. EU donors should adopt a learning approach and start with four to six countries with a 
strong focus on poverty reduction in which the negative effects of the presence of a large 
number of EU donors are particularly high. As a result, the EU should propose to these coun-
tries either an exit of some donors without reducing the total volume of EU aid or a scaling-up 
of aid by only few donors per country. From the perspective of a donor, the reduction of ac-
tivities in a specific country could be compensated by increased activities in another country 
(package solution).  
3. The EU should embed a joint strategy for “orphan” countries in the context of the ongoing 
activities in the DAC fragile states group. The DAC has identified a limited number of “or-
phan” countries. They should receive more ODA without increasing the number of EU do-
nors. As countries with little aid flows can quickly become “darling” countries in the sense of 
a large donor presence when the political situation changes, the EU could pay special atten-
tion to a joint response strategy for these “new” partner countries. 
How to improve cross-sector division of labour 
The EU should improve the cross-sector division of labour through two initiatives: 
1. Based on an individual assessment by each EU donor of the importance of sectors relative 
to its entire portfolio and to its political goals as well as compared to other donors, EU donors 
should discuss a coherent approach of concrete steps towards more sectoral concentration 
while maintaining the diversity of expertise for the EU as a whole. 
2. In new and rapidly growing fields of development co-operation, like for example climate 
change, EU donors should immediately use a division of labour approach and develop a joint 
EU strategy. Thus, an inefficient build-up of identical competences by many individual do-
nors could be avoided. 
 
 
 
Towards a Division of Labour in European Development Co-operation 
German Development Institute 5 
1 Introduction 
The division of labour between donors is an important issue on the agenda of the Paris Decla-
ration on Aid Effectiveness. In many developing countries, the number of aid agencies is very 
high. For example in Tanzania, a country with a population of 37 million, about 40 bi- and 
multilateral donors are operating; 10 EU countries plus the Commission committed more than 
5 million USD of new ODA in 2004 (DPG Tanzania 2006; OECD 2006a).  
While most other issues of the aid effectiveness agenda like harmonisation of donor proce-
dures or alignment with partner country strategies are addressed by numerous initiatives, ac-
tion on division of labour is still very limited. Inconsistencies between previously isolated 
projects as well as transaction costs for the partner countries resulting from the multitude of 
different donor procedures could be reduced in many cases, but the transaction costs resulting 
from the new mechanisms of donor co-ordination like sector-wide approaches are very high 
because of the large number of donors. In addition to co-ordination mechanisms between the 
partner country’s government and the donors, there is a large number of meetings between 
donors. For example, in Tanzania 23 donors (including 9 EU aid agencies) meet every month 
in the “development partner HIV/AIDS group” (DPG Tanzania 2005a). Transaction costs are 
not only a problem when they are a burden for the partner countries’ governance capacities. 
Administrative costs on the donor side reduce the amount of ODA resources actually avail-
able for development programmes benefiting the partner country. The problem of a large 
number of donors is particularly relevant in countries which receive high amounts of ODA in 
relation to their GNI. They should be the priority for action towards a division of labour. In 
sum, it becomes increasingly clear that progress in aid effectiveness depends crucially on a 
reduction of the number of donors involved in the same kind of activities in one country 
(Acharya / Fuzzo de Lima / Moore 2006, 15 ff.; Faust / Messner 2007). The Paris Declaration 
can only become a success if a division of labour between donors is established.  
The EU has decided to address the issue of division of labour in development co-operation. 
On 17 October 2006, the General Affairs and External Relations Council of the EU (GAERC) 
has adopted “EU guiding principles on complementarity and division of labour”. While 
“complementarity” in the context of the EU refers to the relation between the activities of the 
European Commission on the one side and of the Member States on the other, “division of 
labour” is a broader term covering in addition the relation between the activities of the differ-
ent Member States.1 
The ownership of the partner countries is crucial for any division of labour in development 
co-operation, but donors have a responsibility to make proposals how to better organise them-
selves. The EU could advance substantially the donor-wide division of labour and thereby the 
implementation of the Paris Declaration, as it includes 15 of the 22 bilateral donors organised 
in the DAC plus the European Commission. The EU accounted for 52 % of worldwide net 
ODA in 2004 (EC 2006a, 4). Agreements on a division of labour may be easier to reach in the 
EU than in discussions with all donors because it is a political entity with established institu-
tions for joint decision-making. In addition, progress towards more internal division of labour 
would increase the visibility and the political influence of the EU in international develop-
                                                 
1  Complementarity is an important legal principle of EU development co-operation and has been addressed 
for example in communications by the Commission and resolutions by the Council in 1995 and 1999, in the 
development policy statement from 2000 and in the European Consensus on Development from 2005. 
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ment co-operation. It would strengthen the role of development co-operation in EU external 
relations and contribute to the construction of a European identity based on the values con-
tained in the European Consensus on Development adopted in December 2005. However, any 
EU process should be open and aim at the largest possible participation of other donors. The 
EU could act as an engine for a donor-wide division of labour.  
Any strategy for a division of labour within the development co-operation of the EU must 
take account of the significant differences between EU donors: for example, some countries 
provide large total volumes of ODA; some countries have a long tradition of allocating a large 
share of their GNI to ODA (more than the UN target of 0,7%); some countries have main-
tained strong cultural and political ties from their colonial past; some countries have only re-
cently started their development co-operation. Every EU donor has specific expertise and can 
play an active role in a division of labour. In addition, it is important to differentiate between 
the types of activity. For example, the support to local initiatives with small amounts of ODA 
practised by many embassies does not need to be included in a division of labour. A division 
of labour should not lead to rigid bureaucratic rules but leave room for flexibility. 
The main goal of a division of labour is to reduce the number of donors involved in the same 
kind of activities through innovative ways of organizing development cooperation. Instead of 
analysing the activities of a specific donor and making isolated recommendations to improve 
them, a division of labour perspective requires an analysis of the activities of all donors as a 
whole, identifying overlaps and unique features of each donor. The overall benefit could be 
maximised if each donor expanded its particular strengths instead of trying to build new com-
petences or spending scarce resources on overcoming weaknesses in areas where other donors 
show good performance. While the EU as a whole should be able to provide all forms of the-
matic, sectoral and instrumental development operations and be active globally, individual 
donors may specialise in a co-ordinated way on specific countries, themes, sectors and in-
struments. As experience in society and the economy shows, specialisation is a means to im-
prove performance. While it will take time to change the current patterns of aid delivery, a 
division of labour approach could be immediately applied to additional development assis-
tance.  
In fact, the significant increase of ODA planned by the international donor community (“scal-
ing-up”) – the EU has committed itself to concrete intermediate targets for reaching collec-
tively the UN goal of 0.7 % until 2015 – should not reinforce the current fragmentation of the 
aid system. This would have a negative effect on aid effectiveness and the absorption capaci-
ties of partner countries. A co-ordinated approach for spending the additional ODA should be 
based on a division of labour. This perspective is lacking in the current discussions by 
OECD/DAC and World Bank on “scaling up for results” (OECD 2006b). 
On the basis of a conceptual analysis and existing experiences, the study will develop con-
crete proposals how the GAERC guiding principles could be implemented and how the EU 
could advance towards a division of labour in development co-operation. First, it provides an 
overview of the current patterns of EU development co-operation. Second, it discusses key 
concepts that are relevant for organising a division of labour. Third, the study analyses how 
the EU could advance processes to improve the division of labour at the level of the partner 
countries (“in-country division of labour”). Fourth, it discusses how in-country processes can 
be complemented by a better geographic concentration of donors (“cross-country division of 
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labour”). Fifth, it addresses the issue of a sectoral concentration of donors (“cross-sector divi-
sion of labour”).  
For pragmatic reasons, the study focuses on the three dimensions of a division of labour high-
lighted by the GAERC conclusions of 17 October 2006 (“in-country”, “cross-country”, 
“cross-sector”) and does not address the two other dimensions of a division of labour men-
tioned in the GAERC conclusions as points for further discussion (“vertical” and “cross mo-
dalities and instruments”). The “vertical” dimension relates to the role of the EU in the inter-
national aid architecture. While substantial progress in the in-country, cross-country and 
cross-sector dimensions can be achieved by the EU in a first step, this wider question should 
be approached in the future. The EU could, for example, develop joint perspectives on multi-
lateral development organisations like the World Bank, the regional development banks or 
UNDP.2 The “cross modalities and instruments” dimension which includes, for example, the 
issue of loans and grants could be approached within the other dimensions as an issue for fur-
ther operational refinement of a division of labour. 
The approach to a division of labour used in this study starts from the institutional and politi-
cal realities of current development co-operation and identifies concrete steps that can be im-
mediately implemented. Another approach would be to define a political project that develops 
a vision of the role the EU wants to play in the world and formulate proposals for a division 
of labour as an implementation strategy (e.g. Faust / Messner 2004). This would require 
strong attention to the links between development co-operation and the other fields of foreign 
policy of the EU. While the second approach is beyond the scope of this study, the two ap-
proaches would be complementary. 
2 Overview of EU development co-operation 
The analysis of options for a division of labour in European Union development co-operation 
must take account of the differences between the 27 member states and the Commission. 
There will not be a “one size fits all” solution. Donors differ in many respects, for example in 
overall volume, geographic and thematic orientation and the use of instruments. However, 
there is also strong overlap in many areas requiring a better division of labour between EU 
donors.  
2.1 Aid volume 
2.1.1 “New” and “old” member states 
With respect to the volume of aid, it makes sense to differentiate between the “new” member 
states that joined the EU since May 2004 (EU-12) and the other member states, which are all 
members of the DAC (EU-15). While many of the “new” member states have a specific ex-
perience of co-operation with developing countries during the cold war period, they are now 
in the process of building up new structures of development co-operation. A division of la-
                                                 
2  The study focuses on the activities of public agencies. The activities of non-governmental organisations 
which play an important role in development co-operation should be included in this wider approach. 
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bour approach is particularly important in this context. Own experience with bilateral opera-
tions is seen as a necessary basis to participate fully in EU and international development pol-
icy making. Operational co-operation with “old” member states could be a possibility to ac-
celerate the process of building up this expertise. Geographic and sectoral concentration is 
equally important for “old” and “new” member states.  
As Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in January 2007, data in this paper can only refer to 
the new member states that joined in May 2004 (EU-10), while the recommendations are 
relevant for all “new” member states. The net ODA numbers for 2005 show a strong increase 
for the EU-10 (see table 1). However, the “new” member states as a group will remain distinct 
in development co-operation for some time. Within the EU policy for achieving overall a 
share of ODA in GNI of 0,7 % by 2015, they have a separate target of 0.33 %. Given these 
differences and the limited availability of data for the “new” member states, an analytic dis-
tinction will be made in this paper between the EU-12 / EU-10 and the EU-15 (see annex 1 
for a detailed analysis of the EU-10).  
Table 1: Net ODA 2004 and 2005 (in order of 2004)3, USD million4 
Country Net ODA 2004 (% GNI) Net ODA 2005 (% GNI) 
France 8473 (0,41) 10026 (0,47) 
UK 7883 (0,36) 10767 (0,47) 
Germany 7534 (0,28) 10082 (0,36) 
Netherlands 4204 (0,73) 5115 (0,82) 
Sweden 2722 (0,78) 3362 (0,94) 
Italy 2462 (0,15) 5091 (0,29) 
Spain 2437 (0,24) 3018 (0,27) 
Denmark 2037 (0,85) 2109 (0,81) 
Belgium 1463 (0,41) 1963 (0,53) 
Portugal 1031 (0,63) 377 (0,21) 
Austria 678 (0,23) 1573 (0,52) 
Finland 655 (0,35) 902 (0,46) 
Ireland 607 (0,39) 719 (0,42) 
Greece 465 (0,23) 384 (0,17) 
EU-
15 
Luxembourg 236 (0,83) 256 (0,84) 
Poland 118 (0,05) 205 (0,07) 
Czech Republic 108 (0,11) 135 (0,11) 
Hungary 55 (0,06) 100 (0,11) 
Slovenia 31 (0,10) * 
Slovak Republic 28 (0,07) 56 (0,12) 
Malta 10 (0,18) * 
Lithuania 9 (0,04) * 
Latvia 8 (0,06) * 
Estonia 5 (0,05) * 
EU-
10 
Cyprus 5 (0,04) * 
*not reported by DAC 
Source: EC 2006a (for 2004); OECD 2006c (for 2005) 
                                                 
3  The order of 2004 is used because 2005 data are not available for all countries. The DAC (OECD 2006c) 
points out that the strong increases in 2005 are for many countries an effect of exceptionally high debt relief. 
4  Data in this paper is always expressed in USD because this is the currency used in DAC statistics. 
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Among the EU-15, two features are particularly outstanding. First, there are four donors that 
have a long history of spending more than 0.7 % of their GNI to ODA: Denmark, Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg. Second, there are three very large donors in terms of total aid 
volume (France, UK and Germany), a number of donors with an intermediate size of the 
overall aid volume (Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Belgium) and a group of 
donors with a smaller aid volume (Portugal, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Greece and Luxem-
bourg).  
2.1.2 Using the appropriate data for analysing the division of labour 
“Net ODA” provides a first overview of the aid volume of donors and is the only data avail-
able for all EU member states. However, for the purpose of analysing options for a division of 
labour, the indicator “net ODA” is not suitable. Net ODA is constructed to capture the mobili-
sation of new resources from donor countries benefiting developing countries which includes, 
for example, debt relief, imputed student cost, and support to refugees in donor countries. 
Interest and principal payments by developing countries for loans are subtracted from new 
ODA payments. From the perspective of a division of labour, which wants to solve the prob-
lem that too many actors are doing the same, one has to consider all donor activities in devel-
oping countries. While “net ODA” includes payments to multilaterals, a division of labour 
approach must focus on the activities that bilateral donors do themselves as aid agencies.  
The best data for analysing options for a division of labour would be current and planned bi-
lateral commitments of donors to developing countries. In the Paris Declaration on Aid Effec-
tiveness, donors actually commit to provide developing countries “indicative commitments of 
aid over a multi-year framework” (para. 26). However, despite being addressed by the DAC 
fragile states group (OECD 2006d) and the “scaling up for results” initiative by the DAC and 
the World Bank (OECD 2006e), this information is currently not available in a comprehen-
sive way.  
In the absence of these data, it is a sufficient approximation for the purpose of this paper to 
use the data on bilateral commitments collected by the DAC. Commitments are better suited 
for a forward-looking analysis than disbursements (used for the most widely used indicator 
“net ODA”), because they are closer to current policies.5 Disbursements can contain a consid-
erable time lag to the moment when they were allocated during which changes in donor strat-
egy may have occurred.6 Furthermore, commitments contain new aid activities in developing 
countries financed by ODA loans (and do not consider financial flows resulting from past 
activities which are not relevant from the division of labour perspective).  In order to focus on 
aid activities in developing countries, the data used in this paper excludes debt relief, imputed 
student costs7, support to refugees and administrative costs. Furthermore, humanitarian aid is 
                                                 
5  While commitments are the best indicator for the purpose of this paper, one should bear in mind that com-
mitments do not represent actual resource flows (which are not the focus of this paper). There may be con-
siderable time lags between a commitment and disbursement. In addition, for interpreting the data it is im-
portant to note that commitments may be made for several years and therefore can have strong variations. 
6  This happened for example during the concentration of German aid on fewer countries. 
7  Technically, this means: Data were corrected for imputed student cost by excluding the DAC Code 114 
(thereby excluding also all other support to post-secondary education). 
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not taken into account as it is a reaction to humanitarian needs in crisis situations and not part 
of longer-term strategic aid activities.8  
The differences between an analysis of aid volume with the total net ODA concept and these 
adjusted bilateral ODA commitments are particularly high for the large donors (see chart 1). 
The distance between their total aid volume to the donors with an intermediate total aid vol-
ume becomes smaller. France, Germany and the UK all spend high amounts of ODA on debt 
relief. Net ODA for France and Germany includes substantially high imputed student costs. 
On the basis of adjusted bilateral ODA commitments, the aid volume of the EC is almost 
twice as big as the aid volume of the member state with the largest aid volume.  
However, from a division of labour perspective the total aid volume is less important than the 
geographic and thematic focus of each donor. For example, a high degree of geographic con-
centration allows the Netherlands to allocate sums to certain countries that equal or exceed 
those of some of the donors with a larger total aid volume (e.g. in Mozambique, the Nether-
lands committed in 2003 / 2004 higher volumes than Germany).  Another example: Denmark 
is the largest EU donor in water and sanitation in West Africa (EC 2006b, 15). However, total 
aid volume plays a certain role. The amounts allocated by the largest donors to their top re-
cipients are not reached by any of the top recipients of smaller donors. For example in 2003 / 
                                                 
8  For each table, the ODA concept will be specified because of variations due to the data sources used. 
Chart 1: Different measures of ODA (2004) 
 
Source: OECD - IDS online (DAC database) 
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2004, France committed 330 Mio USD to its largest recipient country Morocco, while Swe-
den committed 110 Mio USD to its largest recipient country Tanzania (OECD 2006a).9  
2.2 Geographic orientation 
An analysis of donors in the division of labour perspective must pay special attention to the 
geographic distribution and concentration of aid. The following patterns can be observed: 
— The highest presence of EU donors is in Sub-Sahara Africa, the lowest in Latin Amer-
ica. 
— The European Commission is present globally. 
— Member states, which had colonies, tend to concentrate on these countries (though in 
general not exclusively). 
— Among the three members states with the highest aid volume, France and the UK have 
relatively complementary priorities because of their focus on former colonies, while 
Germany is less focussed and has many overlaps with France and the UK. 
— The three countries with a high ratio of ODA to GNI and an intermediate size total aid 
volume (Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden) have a similar focus on countries in East and 
South Africa and some other countries like Bangladesh, Viet Nam, Bolivia and Nicara-
gua. 
— The New Member States tend to focus aid on their neighbouring countries.  
The geographic concentration of donors varies considerably (see tables 5 and 6 on pages 
30 f.). In some developing countries, there is strong overlap between EU donors (see tables 7 
and 8 on pages 34 f.). This problem relates to all donors present in these countries, independ-
ent from their total aid volume and degree of concentration. 
For example in Nicaragua, a country with a population of 5,6 million in 2004, 8 EU donors 
provided more than 5 million USD ODA in 2004, another 5 provided between 1 and 5 mil-
lion. In addition, the European Commission made substantial commitments (see table 2).  
2.3 Thematic and sectoral orientation 
EU donors give different weight to the components of the “primary and overarching objec-
tive” of the European Consensus on Development, the “eradication of poverty in the context 
of sustainable development, including pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals” (Euro-
pean Parliament / Council / Commission 2006, 2). While some donors focus exclusively on 
poverty reduction, others emphasise in addition sustainable development, peace, human secu-
rity, democracy, rule of law and human rights, equitable globalisation, integration in the world 
economy and cultural diversity (EC 2006a, 54 ff.). 
                                                 
9  Average ODA commitments for 2003 / 2004 excluding debt relief and humanitarian assistance. 
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The Commission used to focus on the following six sectors defined in the development policy 
statement from 2000: trade and development; regional integration and co-operation; support 
for macro-economic policies and promotion of equitable access to social services; transport; 
food security and rural development; institutional capacity-building. The European Consensus 
on Development from December 2005 enlarged the mandate of the Commission to cover in 
fact all sectors (European Parliament / Council / Commission 2006).10 
While EU donors emphasise sectors differently, there is in many developing countries a 
strong overlap of EU donors in some sectors, in particular in health, education, governance 
and macro-economics/budget support. For example, in Tanzania 8 EU donors participated in 
2005 in the donor working group on education and 7 EU donors in the donor working group 
on health (DPG Tanzania 2005a).  
For an overview of the sectoral allocation by the different EU donors, see charts 3 and 4 on 
pages 38 f. 
                                                 
10  The European Consensus states that the Commission should focus on areas where it has “comparative ad-
vantage” and mentions eight areas in which the Commission will be “active primarily” responding to the 
“needs expressed by partner countries” (European Parliament / Council / Commission 2006, 11 ff.). These 
areas cover all sectors: trade and regional integration; environment and sustainable management of natural 
resources; infrastructure, communications and transport; water and energy; rural development, territorial 
planning, agriculture and food security; governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and 
institutional reforms; conflict prevention and fragile states. Thus, there is a potential tension between the re-
quest for complementarity of the Commission’s activities (comparative advantage) and its mandate to cover 
all activities.  
Table 2: Nicaragua: ODA commitments excluding debt relief and hum. ass. (USD million)1 
 2002 2003 2004
Austria 5,4 4,9 7,4
Belgium 1,6 2,2 2,3
Denmark 3,2 27,1 128
Finland 9,2 20,2 24,6
France 0,5 1 1,3
Germany 15,4 13,2 29,7
Greece 0 0 0,5
Ireland 0,4 0,9 1
Italy 2 2,8 1,3
Luxembourg 7 10,8 5,3
Netherlands 17,5 17,9 27,6
Portugal 0 0 0
Spain 30,5 41,8 29,9
Sweden 22,7 16,9 72,4
United Kingdom 0,2 2,5 3,5
EC 15,3 55,5 49,8
1 Table covers three years to take account of multi-annual commitments (for EC: total ODA comm.) 
Source: calculations based on OECD 2006a  
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3 Concepts for organising a division of labour 
The following concepts are used prominently in the debate about a division of labour 
(GAERC 2006; De Renzio / Rogerson 2005; Rocha Menocal / Rogerson 2006; Klein / Har-
ford 2005):  
— ownership of the partner country: the partner countries should decide who they want to 
work with, the donors should not impose a division of labour negotiated amongst them-
selves;  
— comparative advantage: the future role of each donor should be determined by the spe-
cific value they can add; 
— competition: a division of labour should not lead to monopolistic structures that leave 
no choice to partner countries.  
This chapter discusses the potential of these concepts for organising a division of labour. 
3.1 Ownership of the partner country 
A core principle of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is ownership of the partner 
countries. It means that “partner countries exercise effective leadership over their develop-
ment policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development action” (para. 14). The GAERC 
underlined the importance of this principle in its “guiding principles on complementarity and 
division of labour” from 17 October 2006 (GAERC 2006, 2).  
For organising a division of labour between donors, ownership would mean that the partner 
country expresses its perception of comparative advantage (see chapter 3.2) of each donor and 
states who they want to work with – either generally (as the government of India did) or sec-
torally (as the government of Zambia did, see chapter 4.1.1). The donors would then adapt 
their activities accordingly (de Renzio / Rogerson 2005; Rocha Menocal / Rogerson 2006, 9). 
Applying the concept of ownership to the reality of development co-operation is, however, 
more difficult than this normative ideal might suggest. Development co-operation is not a 
technical exercise with the aim of maximising effectiveness on the basis of a model agreed 
upon by all actors but a political process based on value-judgements, interests and negotia-
tion. Nobody – neither a partner country government nor a donor country government – can 
claim to know the “objectively right” development strategy (Kanbur / Sandler / Morrison 
1999). Donors do not simply align to a partner country strategy, they assess it from their point 
of view and influence its substance by negotiating with the partner country government how it 
is implemented. In addition to different views about the “right” development strategy, both 
partner country governments and donors often have other interests besides the goal of maxi-
mising development effectiveness. 
First, bilateral development co-operation is always part of the general relations between a 
partner country and a donor country, so foreign policy and economic interests may interfere 
on both sides with the intention to advance a division of labour. For example, even if from a 
technical point of view some donors may not add significant value for a partner country, both 
sides may want to maintain their aid relations for foreign policy objectives (Kanbur / Sandler / 
Morrison 1999).  
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Second, both partner country governments and donors may pursue selfish interests that make 
an agreement on a division of labour difficult. For example, a partner country may wish do-
nors to stay engaged that are the least demanding in terms of quality of policies. This may not 
be acceptable to the majority of the other donors as the main function of donors is to ensure 
that their funds are used to produce (in their perspective) “good” quality results. Another ex-
ample: a donor may wish to continue existing activities because they correspond to its institu-
tional goals and incentives (which are not necessarily identical with the partner country’s 
goals) or the personal interests of field staff (Easterly 2002; Moss / Pettersson / van de Walle 
2006, 8 f.). 
As a consequence, using the concept of ownership for organising a division of labour requires 
two qualifications: 
1. Both partner country government and donors should provide arguments in terms of 
aid effectiveness to justify their preferences. This dialogue should take place in a 
transparent way, giving different stakeholders a chance to challenge the views ex-
pressed. In combination with the normative commitment of donors to partner country 
ownership, this could reduce the influence of selfish interests. 
2. Negotiations about a division of labour led by a partner country (in-country division 
of labour) should be complemented by reflections on the donor side about their over-
all aid activities (cross-country and cross-sector division of labour). This will facilitate 
in-country processes for two reasons. First, the presence of a large number of donors 
in a country is the result of decisions by these donors. It is not easy for partner coun-
tries to challenge these reasons. As aid recipients they are not in a very strong position 
to solve the problems resulting from a lack of overall donor co-ordination. Donors 
themselves should review the reasons for their decisions and propose to the partner 
country new options for delivering the same aid volume with less donors. This would 
expand the choices of the partner country and increase its ownership. Second, if a di-
vision of labour is only based on in-country processes, a new co-ordination problem 
arises for donors. If a donor is asked by several partner countries to exit from certain 
sectors or even totally from the country, the aggregate impact on its overall aid activi-
ties may become an obstacle to agree on proposals for in-country division of labour. 
3.2 Comparative advantage 
Comparative advantage is a concept widely used in debates about a division of labour in de-
velopment co-operation. In the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, partner countries 
commit to “provide clear views on donors’ comparative advantage” and donors commit to 
“make full use of their respective comparative advantage” (para. 34 f.). The GAERC guide-
lines on complementarity and division of labour from 17 October 2006 state: “Comparative 
advantage is not based primarily on financial resources available but also on a wide range of 
issues such as geographic or thematic expertise. Therefore, each Member State has a role to 
play.” (GAERC 2006, 3) 
The general idea of comparative advantage as an organising principle for a division of labour 
is that each donor should concentrate on countries and sectors / themes where they have a 
strength. Beyond this general statement, however, the concept lacks clarity. 
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First, the concept is used with different meanings. For some, it means what a donor does best 
relative to its own activities. Comparative advantage in this sense is different from an absolute 
or “competitive” advantage meaning that a donor does something better than the other donors 
(DPG Tanzania 2005b). Others use comparative advantage rather in the sense of absolute ad-
vantage, as something a donor can provide that other donors cannot (Rocha Menocal / Roger-
son 2006, 9). From a division of labour point of view, it would already be a progress if donors 
focussed on what they do best within their own portfolio of aid activities. However, a concen-
tration based on absolute advantages – eventually implying the exit of some agencies if they 
do not have any – would be preferable.  
Second, comparative advantage is difficult to determine. There are no comparative assess-
ments of donor performance (Klein / Harford 2005; de Renzio / Rogerson 2005). Instead, 
there are attempts to define lists of criteria for comparative advantage (see annex 3). They 
include experience in a country or sector, technical expertise, presence in the field / human 
resources, trust by the partner country and other donors, volume and efficiency of procedures 
(de Renzio / Rogerson 2005; Nordic Plus Donors 2005; Finland / EC 2006).11 The validity of 
claims donors make about their own comparative advantage in a specific country can be 
checked through peer-reviews and discussions between donors and the partner country. In 
practice, there is some subjective agreement on the quality of the work of different donors 
expressed for example, in scoring exercises (Burall / Maxwell / Rocha Menocal 2006). Gen-
eral claims about comparative advantage on a country or sector level are often not explained. 
In some cases, their validity seems, however, obvious - for example when many new member 
states claim to have a comparative advantage in assisting countries in the same region in the 
transition towards EU standards. 
Third, comparative advantage is a dynamic concept. If it is used to organise a future division 
of labour, a credible commitment of a donor about its future activities is key. While past ex-
perience can be a basis for comparative advantage, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition. If a donor decides to invest substantially in a new activity it could develop a com-
parative advantage over time. The ongoing division of labour exercise in Uganda is not based 
on “comparative advantage”, but on the future plans of donors.  
In sum, the concept of comparative advantage does not provide a clear and objective yardstick 
to judge where a donor has a strength and where not. It should not be understood as a techni-
cal concept, but can be used as a normative reference point in discussions about the strength 
of donors and a division of labour. Clear statements of donors about their future plans are im-
portant as well as a discourse of justification where they perceive their individual strengths. In 
the future, independent comparative evaluations of donor performance should provide a more 
objective basis for organising a division of labour. 
                                                 
11  Often, these criteria are linked to a donor’s qualification for a lead donor role (e.g. Nordic Plus Donors 
2005). 
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3.3 Competition 
The concept of competition is relevant for the following questions about a division of labour: 
What kind of competition is useful? How many donors would be an appropriate number? 
Could there be a market-style organisation of development assistance? 
In a market, there is no need to reflect a priori about a division of labour. It would be the re-
sult of competition and a large number of actors would actually be good as it increases com-
petition (and an organised division of labour between donors, a “cartel”, would be a bad 
thing). While there is wide agreement that development assistance is currently not organised 
as a market, views differ in how far this could be possible (Easterly 2002; Klein / Harford 
2005; Messner / Faust 2007).  
It is useful to distinguish between different types of activities in development co-operation to 
discuss the possible role of competition:  
— general political dialogue (overall development strategy); 
— sectoral policy dialogue; 
— programme and project appraisal and monitoring; 
— programme and project implementation.  
All donors currently perform the first three types of activities, some are also active in the im-
plementation of technical assistance. General political dialogue and sectoral policy dialogue 
are essentially political in nature and cannot be organised as a market (see chapter 3.1). The 
appraisal and monitoring of the use of public funds is less political, but still a public function 
that cannot be privatised or organised as a market (this is particularly evident in the case of 
budget support). The implementation of programmes and projects is already partially organ-
ised in a market way, with public tenders for infrastructure construction or consultancy work. 
The debate about the untying of financial and technical assistance aims at increasing competi-
tion in this type of activity.  
In the political parts of development co-operation, market-style competition between donors 
is not a useful concept. However, there are different views about the “right” development 
policies, and democratic politics is essentially a process of coming to decisions in a world of 
different views. Therefore, a plurality of donors is desirable in principle (and “pluralism” 
would be the appropriate concept in this context, not “competition”). However, there is a limit 
to the use of pluralism when negotiation processes become too time-consuming and difficult 
because of a large number of actors. Theory cannot prescribe an optimal number of actors 
(Acharya / Fuzzo de Lima / Moore 2006, 14), but partner countries and donors could agree on 
a number of actors they perceive as effective based on common sense. It seems obvious that 
20 donors discussing a sectoral policy are too many, but it is a political decision to limit this 
number to, for example, 5 donors. 
3.4 Conclusion: Combining a technical and a political approach 
The search for a division of labour aims at a more “rational” organisation of development 
activities. There is, however, no technical solution for a division of labour because it involves 
essentially political processes. Normative concepts like ownership, comparative advantage 
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and competition / pluralism can give an orientation and structure the political process, but not 
replace it. Therefore, a division of labour should not be approached by a long search for pre-
cisely defined concepts or for a blueprint solution. Rather, a well-structured political process 
should be initiated. First steps towards a division of labour should be done quickly and these 
experiences should be fed-back in the process.  
The conceptual analysis leads to the following recommendations for structuring this process: 
1. Link in-country processes based on the principle of ownership with cross-country/ 
cross-sector donor-initiatives: Donors should expand the options available to partner 
countries for organising a division of labour and not leave it to them to find a solution 
to the current situation donors are responsible for. 
2. Make clear political statements about future plans and the reasons for the planned ac-
tivities (making explicit reference to what other donors do and having a dialogue with 
partner countries and other donors about these arguments) and increase knowledge 
about comparative advantage through comparative evaluations of donor performance. 
3. Find a pragmatic balance between pluralism and a reduction of the number of donors 
(linked with procedures for increased donor accountability). 
4 In-country division of labour 
In many developing countries, the number of donors per sector is very large. Co-ordination 
meetings between donors themselves and between donors and the partner country’s govern-
ment are intended to increase the coherence and alignment of different donor activities. How-
ever, because of the large number of actors they have created high transaction cost. 
At the GAERC on 17 October 2006, the EU member states committed themselves “to focus 
their participation only in a limited number of sectors or themes in each partner country” and 
to discuss how this should be implemented (GAERC 2006, 3 f.).  
An analysis of the following processes (chapter 4.1) is particularly relevant for developing 
proposals (chapter 4.2) how EU donors could reduce the number of sectors in which they are 
active and increase the in-country division of labour: 
— In some countries, formal “division of labour exercises” are implemented in the context 
of donor-wide joint assistance strategies with the aim of reducing the number of donors 
per sector and assigning sector lead donor roles.12 
— The EU has started to implement a framework for joint programming requiring a division 
of labour between EU donors as part of a joint response strategy.  
— Delegated co-operation is used to support sectors and countries by using the capacities of 
other donors. 
                                                 
12  The “division of labour exercises” are the most comprehensive and explicit practice of addressing the prob-
lem of the large number of donors. However, there are many other initiatives to improve donor co-
ordination and complementarity. For example, lead donor arrangements are also used in the context of gen-
eral budget support.  
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4.1 Ongoing processes 
4.1.1 Division of labour exercises in the context of joint assistance strategies 
Since 2004, donor-wide processes to formulate a joint assistance strategy (JAS) have been 
initiated in a number of countries.13 Joint assistance strategies are medium-term strategies 
which contain an analysis of the situation in the partner country and a joint donor response 
outlining how donors will support the partner country’s development strategy, including ways 
how donors will work together.14 The first joint assistance strategy was adopted in Uganda in 
October 2005. For many donors, it became the official strategy document replacing the own 
format for country strategy papers (e.g. World Bank, Germany, UK). In Tanzania, a joint as-
sistance strategy was launched officially in December 2006. JAS are currently drafted in 
Zambia, Ghana and Kenia. In some other countries, similar processes were launched.15 
The division of labour between donors is mentioned in the joint assistance strategy documents 
as an important task, but the elaboration of concrete proposals is part of a separate “division 
of labour exercise”. In Zambia, it preceded the drafting of the JAS and has already been com-
pleted. In Uganda, it follows the formulation of the JAS and is currently ongoing (results are 
expected in March 2007). In Tanzania, it was started in parallel to the JAS process and is still 
ongoing. Thus, the empirical evidence about these processes is still very limited. However, 
bearing in mind this limitation, the following observations are possible. 
The division of labour exercise has two objectives: 
— reduce the number of donors per sector;  
— improve the ways donors and the partner country government interact at sector level 
(through sector lead donors).  
While the first objective is a general statement which is not further specified (“the number… 
will be limited to an appropriate level, depending on the needs and capacity of the sec-
tor/thematic area” United Republic of Tanzania 2006, 13), the second objective is ap-
proached in Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda through the assignment of different roles donors 
can play, in particular the lead donor approach (for details see annex 3): 
1. lead donor (for sector or sub-sectors): focal point for partner country government, co-
ordinates and speaks on behalf of donors;  
                                                 
13  In Uganda, the process was started by a limited number of donors and later joined by others. In other coun-
tries, there is already initially a large number of donors. 
14  There are some differences between countries. In Tanzania, the analysis is not part of the document called 
“Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania” which focuses on the ways the different actors (domestic institu-
tions and donors) should work together. The analysis and a joint donor response are part of a “Tanzania 
Joint Program Document”. The two documents together “constitute the joint assistance strategy” (Embassy 
of Denmark Dar es Salaam 2006). 
15  The issues paper from the Presidency and the Commission on Complementarity and Division of Labour 
from September 2006 names the following countries: Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, India, Kenya, Kyr-
gyzstan, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Samoa, Sudan, South-Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia – refer-
ring to the Status Report of Local Process on Aid Effectiveness presented by the Commission services, doc. 
no 65/06 DEVGEN (Finland / EC 2006, 3) 
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2. active donors: participate in sector policy dialogue and administer own sector activi-
ties; 
3. delegating (also called “background” or “silent”) donors: contribute only financially 
to sector activities administered by other donors or to sector baskets / budgets; 
4. donors phasing-out: withdraw from the sector. 
According to the Tanzanian joint assistance strategy, the lead donor role can rotate (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2006, 13). In Zambia, a longer-term commitment is emphasised which 
should correspond to the period of the national strategy or the joint assistance strategy (JASZ 
Working Group 2005, 5).  
The division of labour exercise is organised in the following way (the process varies slightly 
in the different countries):  
— First, there is a questionnaire in which donors state what they are currently doing and in 
which sectors they want to engage in the future (and which they intend to leave) – with-
out making a binding commitment.16 This includes the question what role they want to 
play in the sectors chosen (lead, active, delegating), including an explanation why the do-
nors think they have the necessary qualifications - in particular for a lead donor role. In 
Zambia, the qualifications for the lead donor were defined in the questionnaire; in 
Uganda, donors were invited to express their views on a number of possible criteria for 
lead and active donors (see annex 3). In Zambia, the number of possible lead donor roles 
was limited to three per donor.  
— Second, the donor statements are subject to discussion and validation, which may include 
peer-reviews and comments from the partner government.17  
— Third, on the basis of possibly revised donor statements, a first proposal for the future 
roles of donors in each sector is compiled. In Zambia, this was done by the ministry of fi-
nance. In Uganda, the elaboration of this proposal is planned to take place in the sector 
working groups. 
— Fourth, the proposal is discussed between the government and the donors. As result, a 
final division of labour matrix is agreed upon.18  
The “Nordic Plus” Donors (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, Netherlands and 
UK) adopted “complementarity principles” that should guide their participation in the divi-
sion of labour exercises in Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, including for example a commit-
ment to limit the active involvement of each donor to a maximum of three sectors (see an-
nex 4) 
                                                 
16  In Tanzania, there was no questionnaire but statements of interest in donor working groups. 
17  A peer review process was only formalized in Uganda. The processes in Zambia and Tanzania were less 
structured. 
18  The division of labour matrix has similarities with Comprehensive Development Framework matrices or 
donor matrices contained in country strategy papers of many donors (e.g. European Commission). The dif-
ferences are: it is a picture of future activities agreed by all partners and it specifies the roles of the donors. 
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At present, the division of labour exercise has only been completed in Zambia. In Tanzania, a 
division of labour matrix reflecting the donor statements was included in the joint program 
document, but it is only an intermediate result.19  
Both matrices show only incremental progress in the reduction of the number of donors as a 
result of the division of labour exercises (see table 3 for Zambia and annex 3 for Tanzania). 
The number of donors per sector was barely reduced. Even if the questionnaire in Zambia did 
not explicitly ask for a reduction of sectors and focussed on the interest of donors to take a 
lead function in a maximum of three sectors, there was a clear understanding that the number 
of donors should be reduced. In addition, there is a large number of lead donors in Zambia. 
This is partly due to sub-sector leads and the amount of co-ordination work resulting from the 
remaining large number of donors. Over time, the number of lead donors per sector could be 
reduced if trust in the lead donor concept is established, the number of donors per sector is 
reduced further and regular peer reviews of lead donor performance are established. It seems 
fair to conclude that the willingness of donors to withdraw from sectors they are currently 
engaged in is limited. The division of labour exercises should focus more on a real reduction 
of the number of donors. Otherwise, the transaction costs of donor co-ordination remain very 
high. 
A systematic assessment of experiences with lead donor roles is not possible in this paper. In 
Zambia, general terms of reference were formulated and their specification for each sector is 
currently under way. However, sector lead donor arrangements exist already in some coun-
tries in sector working groups or in general budget support groups. Practices vary strongly in 
terms of duration and mandate. From a division of labour point of view, arrangements are 
preferable that assure a sufficient continuity for a lead donor to build up and exercise exper-
tise and that go beyond mere administrative function (“secretarial” tasks like convening meet-
ings and spreading information), reducing not only the transaction cost of partner country 
governments by having only one contact point, but also of donors by delegating tasks from 
sector policy dialogue.  
4.1.2 EU joint programming 
The GAERC agreed at its meeting on 10 and 11 April 2006 “to develop a two-step approach 
towards joint multi-annual programming, consisting in a joint analysis of the country situa-
tion and, gradually, a joint response strategy, duly taking into account the competences of the 
Community and of Member States” (Council of the European Union 2006, 35). This approach 
is based on the “Common Format for Country Strategy Papers” (EC 2006c). At the GAERC 
on 17 October 2006, the Member States and the Commission repeated their commitment to 
implement the joint programming framework (GAERC 2006, 4). 
Implementation of the joint response strategy will include a division of labour between EU 
donors, documented in a prospective donor matrix. The common format does not give guid-
ance, however, how such a division of labour can be achieved.  
                                                 
19  Unlike previous versions, this matrix includes only the intention of donors to remain in a sector, delegate 
cooperation or phase-out, not the attribution of lead roles. Lead donor arrangements are currently under  
review in order to make them more consistent across sectors. 
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The Commission and Member States have agreed to advance joint programming in selected 
countries through joint missions between November 2006 and January 2007 (Ethiopia, Soma-
lia, Mali, Haiti, Tanzania; joint programming for DRC should be discussed at a seminar in 
Brussels).  
EU joint programming is very similar to JAS processes. Therefore, the GAERC highlighted in 
April 2006 that EU joint programming should not lead to “parallel processes” to donor-wide 
initiatives (Council of the European Union 2006, 35). Joint programming can be merged with 
JAS processes. The structure of the common format could be a reference point for a donor-
wide strategy process. The EU could initiate donor-wide strategy processes by starting to im-
plement EU joint programming and inviting other donors to participate. 
4.1.3 Delegated co-operation 
The 2003 DAC compendium on “harmonising donor practices for effective aid delivery” 
identified delegated co-operation as a good practice to improve aid effectiveness through 
“greater use of the comparative advantage of individual donors”. It defines: “Delegated co-
operation occurs when one donor (a “lead” donor) acts on behalf of one or more other do-
nors (the “delegating” donors or “silent partners”). The level and form of delegation vary, 
ranging from responsibility for one element of the project cycle for a specific project (e.g. a 
Table 3: Results of the division of labour exercise in Zambia  
Sector Number of 
donors before 
the exercise 
(total / EU) 
Number of 
active do-
nors, incl. 
lead donors  
(total / EU) 
Number of 
lead donors 
(total / EU) 
Number of 
background 
donors (total / 
EU) 
Number of do-
nors phasing-out 
(total / EU) 
Agriculture 10 (4) 8 (3) 3 (1) 1 (-) 1 (1) 
Decentralisation 9 (5) 6 (3) 3 (1) 3 (2) 2 (1)  
Education 14 (6) 10 (5) 2 (2) 2 (-) 2 (1) 
Energy 6 (2) 4 (1) 1 (-) 2 (-) - 
Gender 4 (1) 4 (1) 1 (-) - - 
Governance 12 (8) 10 (6) 3 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 
Health 11 (6) 9 (4) 3 (1) - 2 (2) 
Housing  3 (1) 2 (-) - (-) (-) 1 (1) 
HIV/AIDS 9 (3) 7 (2) 3 (1) 2 (1)  1 (1) 
Macro-economics 13 (8) 9 (6) 3 (2) 4 (2)  - 
Private sector devel-
opment 
11 (5) 7 (3) 3 (2) 3 (2) 1 (1) 
Social protection 5 (2) 4 (2) 2 (2) 1 (-) - 
Science and technology 1 (-) -  -  - 1 (-) 
Tourism 4 (-) 4 (-) 2 (-) - - 
Water 9 (5) 7 (3) 2 (2) 2 (2) - 
Transport 9 (3) 7 (2) 1 (1) 1 (-) 1 (1) 
Environment 5 (2) 4 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) - 
Source: Zambia Donor Matrix 13 June 2006, see annex 3 (20 donors, of which 9 from EU-15) 
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particular review) to a complete sector programme or even country programme.” (OECD 
2003, 89) 
Delegation can relate to the administration of financial support, but also to sector policy dia-
logue. The different roles of donors defined in the JAS division of labour exercises (sector 
lead donors, active donors and delegating donors) are a special case of delegated co-operation. 
“Silent partnership” is also a form of delegated co-operation, relating to the role of the dele-
gating partner.  
There are many cases of delegated co-operation (OECD 2003; Koopman 2005; British High 
Commission South Africa 2006), e.g.: 
— In Malawi, Sweden delegated its country programme to Norway, meaning that Norway 
plans the programme together with the government of Malawi and Sweden contributes 
money and expertise. In Mali, Norway delegated its programme to Sweden. 
— In South Africa, DFID delegated the implementation of its support to land reform to Bel-
gium.  
— In Rwanda, Sweden delegated the monitoring and auditing of funds in support to the edu-
cation sector to DFID, which is providing general budget support. 
The DAC (OECD 2003) and the Nordic Plus Donors (2006) formulated guiding principles for 
the implementation of delegated co-operation (see annex 5). While the benefits of delegated 
co-operation in form of reduced transaction costs for the partner country and the delegating 
donor are undisputed, there can be substantial costs for preparing a delegated co-operation 
arrangement (Koopman 2005, 6; Nordic Plus Donors 2006, 9). The delegating donor has to 
verify the adequacy of the policies and procedures of the donor it wants to entrust to act on its 
behalf. By recognizing each other as potential partners after a joint assessment, the Nordic 
Plus donors reduced this initial transaction cost. They invited other donors to join their group 
after a similar assessment (Nordic Plus Donors 2006, 4 f.). Furthermore, delegated co-
operation arrangements require a clear definition of the roles and duties of both sides. In par-
ticular, it is the responsibility of the lead donor to inform the delegating donor; and it is the 
responsibility of the delegating donor to remain silent vis-à-vis the partner country (Nordic 
Plus Donors 2006, 14).  
In sum, delegated co-operation is a form of division of labour with transaction costs that can 
be lowered when it becomes more frequently used. It is an intermediate option between being 
present in a country or sector through own activities and not engaging / withdrawing from a 
sector or country. It allows a donor to demonstrate visibly its support for certain activities 
while reducing transaction costs. Compared to a division of labour agreement where one do-
nor takes responsibility for one sector and another donor takes responsibility for another sec-
tor, it is a less advanced form of division of labour. However, it is a useful instrument to in-
crease the division of labour in the short run. 
4.2 Recommendation for the EU: A code of conduct for in-country division of 
labour 
Co-ordinated concentration processes like donor-wide “division of labour exercises” are most 
important for increasing the sectoral division of labour at the partner country level. In coun-
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tries where donor-wide strategy initiatives do not exist, EU joint programming could be used 
to initiate such processes by inviting other donors to participate. Division of labour exercises 
should become part of EU joint programming. They should focus on political statements of 
interest and a well-structured discussion between donors and the partner country’s govern-
ment about the role of each donor.  
First experiences with donor-wide division of labour exercises show that the willingness of 
donors to focus their activities is key to success. Therefore, the EU could advance these proc-
esses by applying good practices specified in a code of conduct (as the Nordic Plus countries 
have done for the joint assistance strategy processes in Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia). The 
code of conduct would be relevant both for joint assistance strategies and EU joint program-
ming. It could contain in particular the following aspects, which have a high potential for ad-
vancing in-country division of labour: 
— limited number of sectors per donor; 
— limited number of donors per sector; 
— using lead donor arrangements for sector policy dialogue; 
— using delegated co-operation arrangements outside focal sectors. 
To ensure the implementation of the code of conduct and to learn from the experiences in the 
field, the EU should select countries where these principles can be applied immediately and 
monitor progress. 
4.2.1 Limited number of sectors per donor  
EU donors should define a limited number of sectors for the activities of each donor in a part-
ner country.  
Some EU donors have already adopted policies limiting the number of sectors they are active 
in (see table 4). The policies vary considerably, however, and foresee between 1 and 5 sectors. 
Some donors allow for additional activities in politically important fields. The Nordic Plus 
Donors (2005) committed to focus on a maximum of three sectors following the partner coun-
try’s definition of sectors (general budget support is not considered as a sector).  
In order to provide significant support, it seems important to relate the number of sectors to 
the actual volume of the activities of the donor as the EC does.20 
In addition to limiting the number of sectors, it seems important that the donor’s definition of 
sectors matches with the definition of sectors of the partner country. Otherwise, a sector con-
centration will not contribute to the reduction of transaction costs of donor co-ordination 
which is organised following the sector definitions of the partner country. If a donor has 
broader definitions in order to use them in all its partner countries,21 it should focus within this 
broader category on only one sector as defined by the partner country. If a donor has defined 
                                                 
20  The EC criterion of 40m Euro is, of course, too high for bilateral donors. 
21  Germany has for example defined 10 sector categories applied globally.  
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cross-cutting areas in addition to focal sectors, they should be considered as a “normal” sector 
if they coincide with a sector as defined by the partner country.  
A limitation to, for example, a maximum of 3 sectors (depending of the total volume of aid 
provided by the donor) as defined by the partner country would substantially increase the cur-
rent sectoral concentration. The division of labour matrices for Zambia and Tanzania (see 
annex 3) show that there is room for improvement even for donors which have already de-
fined a maximum number of sectors. In Zambia, EU donors are – after the division of labour 
exercise – active in 3 to 6 sectors (excluding general budget support / macroeconomics). 
However, there should be some flexibility to account for the differences in sector definitions 
between the partner countries: some use very narrow definitions, others use broad definitions. 
4.2.2 Limited number of donors per sector  
EU donors should limit the number of EU donors active in a sector. The Nordic Plus donors 
(7 countries) want to be present with a maximum of 3 of them per sector. 
The experience with the division of labour exercises in Zambia and Tanzania shows that the 
process of reducing the number of actors is slow and that there is still a large number of do-
nors in some sectors. In Zambia, 6 out of 10 donors remaining in the sectors macro-
economics and governance and 5 out of 10 in the education sector are from the EU. 
The optimal number of donors is difficult to determine and depends on the size of the country, 
the needs of the sector and the kind of activities of donors. While the first two aspects vary 
from case to case, the kind of activities of donors is of particular relevance for formulating a 
policy about the appropriate number of donors. A large number of donors creates particularly 
high costs in sector policy dialogue and co-ordination meetings. If donors are active in a sec-
tor with own projects and programmes that are aligned with the partner country’s strategy and 
Table 4: Maximum number of sectors per partner country  
Country Number of Sectors 
Belgium 5 sectors 
Denmark 3 sectors + budget support 
EC If > 40m EUR: 2 sectors + budget support,  
if < 40m EUR: 1 sector + budget support 
Finland 3 sectors 
Germany 3 sectors + budget support 
Luxembourg 4 sectors 
Netherlands 3 sectors 
Portugal 3-4 sectors 
Slovak Republic 3 sectors 
Spain 3 sectors (on average) 
Source: Migliorisi 2005, 14; updated for policy changes in Germany and Portugal in 2006 
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use harmonised procedures, but delegate participation in sector policy dialogue and co-
ordination meetings to another donor, their presence in the sector does not create problems.  
In many cases, the EU could significantly reduce transaction costs by limiting the number of 
EU donors active in sector policy dialogue and donor co-ordination to, for example, three. 
This number should, however, be adapted to the concrete situation in each country. As an 
alternative to fixing an absolute number, the EU could also use the more case specific target 
of reducing the current number of donors by a certain percentage, for example, 40 %. 
4.2.3 Using lead donor arrangements for sector policy dialogue  
EU donors should support lead donor arrangements for sector policy dialogue (see chapter 
4.1.1 and annex 3).  
The mandate of a lead donor can vary from a rather administrative, secretarial function to a 
substantial leadership role within a mandate given by the other donors. From a division of 
labour perspective, preference should be given to a substantial delegation of tasks to the lead 
donor who should act transparently and be held accountable, for example, through regular 
peer reviews.  
The length of the mandate can vary from an annual rotation to the period of a national strat-
egy. It can also be linked to the period a specific person is assigned to a country. From a divi-
sion of labour perspective, rotation should be limited in order to allow the build-up of institu-
tional know-how.  
In Zambia, there are three lead donors in many sectors as a result of the division of labour 
exercise. In part, this is due to a sub-sector division of labour between lead donors. However, 
to reduce transaction costs it would be preferable to have only one lead donor. The EU could 
commit that at maximum one EU donor will take a lead donor role in a sector.  
The role of a lead donor can be taken by any EU donor with sufficient expertise, long-term 
commitment, staff capacity and trust by the partner country and other donors – independent 
from its aggregate size. For example in Zambia, Ireland is a lead donor in the education sec-
tor. 
4.2.4 Using delegated co-operation arrangements outside focal sectors  
EU donors should use delegated co-operation in the sense of entrusting another donor with the 
administration and implementation of its funds if they want to support activities outside their 
own sector of concentration.  
Delegated co-operation can be particularly useful in the process of increasing sector concen-
tration. It allows withdrawing from a sector on the operational level while visibly demonstrat-
ing continuous financial support. It should be clearly communicated that using delegated co-
operation is not a support of less quality, but actually increases aid effectiveness.  
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The delegation of authority to other EU donors could be facilitated by a mutual recognition of 
EU donors as potential partners for delegated co-operation. EU donors could, for example, 
expand the Nordic plus initiative of a joint assessment of policies and procedures. 
5 Cross-country division of labour  
The presence of donors in developing countries varies considerably. In a number of countries, 
a large number of donors leads to high transaction costs (see in-country division of labour). In 
addition, the amounts of aid received by developing countries vary considerably. Although 
there is no necessary link between the number of actors and the amount of aid provided (in 
fact, a few well focussed donors could provide substantial amounts of aid), the two aspects of 
donor presence and amounts allocated are closely related and should be analysed together. 
The GAERC (2006) specified the following tasks for a cross-country division of labour:  
— reinforce the geographical focus of member states and avoid spreading resources too 
thinly based on a dialogue within the EU and taking into account the broader donor en-
gagement, discuss responsible strategies for reducing activities in non-focal countries; 
— address the current imbalance in resources provided to aid "darlings" and "orphans" and 
avoid the creation of new imbalances based on an assessment of aid levels using relevant, 
forward-looking data and a dialogue with other donors and relevant international bodies. 
Because the goal of division of labour is to reduce the number of donors doing the same, the 
focus in the cross-country dimension should be to reduce the number of donors per country. 
Therefore, the starting point for operationalising the GAERC tasks is the analysis of options 
to increase the geographic focus of EU donors. A consideration of aid levels has to be part of 
these options, but aid “orphans” and “darlings” could also be the subject of specific strategies. 
An analysis of the following processes (chapter 5.1) is particularly relevant for developing 
proposals (chapter 5.2) how the GAERC conclusions can be implemented: 
— All donors have procedures for selecting priority countries and allocating aid that in some 
cases have already led to substantial geographic concentration.  
— There is an academic debate about selectivity and optimal aid allocation discussing how 
aid levels can be assessed and how much aid should be given to each developing country. 
— The DAC fragile states group analyses and addresses the problem of aid “orphans” that 
are fragile states. 
5.1 Ongoing processes 
5.1.1 Selection of partner countries by EU donors 
All bilateral EU donors have procedures for selecting partner countries that could be a basis 
for further geographic concentration. Criteria used for this purpose include the economic and 
social situation (in particular the degree of poverty), the potential for promoting democracy 
and good governance, the experience with past co-operation in this country, the presence of 
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an embassy, the relevance for global public goods and historical or cultural ties (Migliorisi 
2005, 75). Some donors also take into account the level of ODA from other countries.  
In addition to these criteria, the selection of partner countries also implies political considera-
tions. In countries with separate ministries for development co-operation, this includes nego-
tiations with the ministry of foreign affairs. The decision-making process also includes par-
liaments and domestic interest groups. In the end, the selection of partner countries is pre-
pared on the basis of criteria, but decided politically.  
The same applies to the allocation of funds to the selected countries. The Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and the EC (for the EDF) use formal allocation models to support decision-
making,22 but the actual levels of aid are decided politically (OECD 2005a, 13; Migliorisi 
2005, 13). 
To conclude, the existing procedures are a starting point for unilateral action towards increas-
ing geographic concentration. In this context, it is good practice for a division of labour to 
take into account the activities of other donors. Because of the political nature of decision-
making and different emphasis on the objectives of development co-operation, there is little 
potential for joint criteria and joint decision-making in the short run.  
5.1.2 The debate about selectivity and optimal aid allocation 
The academic debate about selectivity and optimal aid allocation is relevant for the issue of 
aid “darlings” and “orphans” because it attempts to provide a yardstick for assessing aid lev-
els. It aims at directing aid to countries where it is most effective and is based on the same 
logic as the allocation formulas used by some aid agencies as an orientation for decision-
making: maximising poverty reduction by focussing on the quality of a country’s policies 
(Wood 2006, 13 and 18). 23   
There is, however, little explicit analysis of “darling” and “orphan” countries in the literature 
on selectivity and optimal aid allocation. Generally, the definition of “darlings” and “orphans” 
is based on deviations from the optimal aid level predicted by a model. In a study of aid flows 
to fragile states, Dollar / Levin (2005, 17) define “darlings” (respectively “orphans“) as coun-
tries that receive more (respectively less) than 2.50 USD of aid per capita than their statistical 
model would predict. As a general observation, the Human Development Report 2005 notes 
that the use of simplistic allocation models can even contribute to the creation of aid darlings 
and orphans “based on flimsy evidence about their capacity to make good use of aid”. It sees 
an “overconcentration of donor darlings in Anglophone Sub-Saharan Africa (and Mozam-
bique and Ethiopia) and an overrepresentation of donor orphans in Francophone Africa and 
Latin America”, but does not explain the method behind this observation (UNDP 2005, 92). 
The debate about aid allocation models reflects the methodological difficulties with assessing 
aid levels. Simple models are proposed to determine how much aid should be allocated to 
each country in order to maximise poverty reduction, for example using the current poverty 
                                                 
22  For a description of these allocation models see OECD 2005a. 
23  In addition to the normative approach, there are also empirical analyses about the actual allocation by donors 
showing a range of objectives in addition to poverty reduction (OECD 2005a, 25) 
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level (measured by GNP/capita) and the quality of governance (measured by the CPIA) as 
allocation criteria. The appropriateness of these models is strongly criticised. First, 
GNP/capita is not a sufficient indicator for poverty and the needs of the developing country. 
Second, poverty reduction is not the only objective of donors. Third, important variables of 
aid effectiveness like absorption capacity are not taken into account. Fourth, the assumed rela-
tions between aid, growth and poverty reduction are too simplistic (OECD 2005a; McGil-
livray 2006; Amprou / Guillaumont / Guillaumont Jeannery 2006) 
While it is possible to construct sophisticated models taking into account these criticisms (e.g. 
Amprou / Guillaumont / Guillaumont Jeannery 2006; Wood 2006), the use of these models 
for policy making is limited because they become very difficult to interpret and explain. In 
addition, it would be difficult to reach agreement between donors on allocation criteria and 
their relative weight in a model (Wood 2006, 13). 
Given the complex reality of development and development co-operation, formal allocation 
models (as used by academia and by some aid agencies) can serve as an orientation for deci-
sion-making, but not replace country-specific analysis and the political setting of priorities. 
They are a tool for approaching cross-country allocation on a global scale, but are not suffi-
cient to assess what amounts of aid are appropriate for the needs and absorptive capacities of 
specific countries. The debate about selectivity and optimal aid allocation does not provide 
easy answers to identifying “darling” and “orphan” countries.  
5.1.3 Aid “orphans” in the DAC fragile states group 
Since 2005, the DAC fragile states group monitors on an annual basis the resource flows to 
fragile states. In this context, “orphan” countries are identified that should receive more ODA 
because of their needs (GNI/capita) and the quality of their policies (CPIA).24  
In its 2006 report, the following countries are identified as aid “orphans” (the DAC calls them 
“marginalised countries”): Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Nigeria, Uz-
bekistan and Yemen.  
In addition, the DAC identified a second group of countries with low levels of aid linked with 
poor quality of institutions and policies: Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, 
Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Zimbabwe. A last group of countries has low, but increas-
ing aid levels: Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Chad, Niger, Cambodia, Tajikistan and 
Eritrea. (OECD 2006d) 
The distinction between these groups expresses that the issue of “orphans” should not be 
equalled to countries receiving little aid. In some cases of the second group, low aid is the 
result of explicit political decisions by donors in reaction to bad policies. The DAC neither 
calls them “orphans” nor recommends higher aid volumes for these countries. It stresses that 
they require nevertheless specific attention and a coherent international strategy (OECD 
2006d, 4). 
                                                 
24  The DAC fragile states group focuses mainly on aid “orphans” because low levels of external support are a 
particularly important problem for fragile states. There are, however, also a few aid “darlings” in the fragile 
states group, e.g. Afghanistan (Dollar / Levin 2005). 
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The DAC fragile states group recommends to discuss for each country in donor-wide forums 
like consultative group meetings whether the analysis is correct and how donors could re-
spond to the situation. 25 In addition, the DAC recommends to improve at the global level the 
co-ordination of aid allocation to fragile states, in particular through information sharing on 
planned aid allocations. A senior level meeting on these issues is planned for 2007/2008 
(OECD 2006d, 5).  
5.2 Recommendations for the EU 
Because the decisions about country selection and aid allocation have a strong political com-
ponent, they should not be approached by a purely technical approach as in the debate on op-
timal aid allocation. The following options for implementing the GAERC conclusions com-
bine technical goals (concentration, optimal allocation) with political realities:  
— review of current degree of geographic concentration by each EU donor;  
— joint analysis and strategy for EU “darling” countries; 
— joint EU response strategy for “orphan” countries in the context of the DAC fragile states 
group. 
The two goals of increasing geographic concentration and avoiding the creation of “darling” 
and “orphan” countries are linked. The proposed options are complementary and should be 
implemented simultaneously.  
5.2.1 Review of geographic concentration by each member state and co-ordinated 
reduction of priority countries 
Each EU donor should individually assess its current degree of geographic concentration by 
benchmarking against other donors of similar size. As the choice of partner countries is highly 
political, this assessment is mainly a national task. However, the individual reviews should be 
accompanied by an exchange of views on good practices and a discussion about the appropri-
ate level of concentration.  
All EU donors have focussed their aid on a limited number of priority partner countries (see 
tables 5 and 6 and annex 2). Many donors distinguish between core priority countries and 
other priority countries they co-operate with. In addition, all donors have small aid activities 
(below 1 million USD) in a much larger number of countries. If these small activities do not 
involve high administrative cost for the partner countries, they could be left out of further 
efforts of geographic concentration. 
                                                 
25  There is a need for clarification of the role of additional aid in relation to other forms of foreign and security 
policy which could be very costly (OECD 2005a, 25). 
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However, the number of priority countries in relation to the aid volume and the amounts actu-
ally allocated to them vary considerably. A comparison with other donors of similar size 
could help to identify room for improvement. This could be done on the basis of agreed-upon 
indicators like the number of priority countries in relation to the total bilateral aid volume, the 
percentage of bilateral aid spent on core priority countries or the mean allocation per priority 
country.  
If an EU donor decides to reduce its number of priority countries, a consultation with the 
other EU donors should take place about their planned presence and allocation as well as the 
overall aid level in the countries concerned. Thus, an unintended fall in the overall aid level of 
a country (possibly leading to new “orphans”) can be avoided.  
Table 5: Geographic concentration of EU-15 donors  
 (average ODA commitments 2003/2004 excluding debt relief and humanitarian assistance) 
 
 Bilateral 
ODA 
volume1 
(USD 
mio) 
Number of 
priority 
countries 
(core pri-
ority coun-
tries) 
 
Number 
of coun-
tries 
receiving 
ODA 
comm. 
>0 Mio 
USD 
Number 
of coun-
tries 
receiving 
ODA 
comm. 
>1 Mio 
USD 
Number 
of coun-
tries 
receiving 
ODA 
comm. >5 
Mio USD
Number 
of coun-
tries 
receiving 
ODA 
comm. 
>10 Mio 
USD 
Aid allocated to  
first / second / tenth 
largest recipient 
(USD Mio) 
Austria 131 29 (12) 85 33 8 4 20 / 20 / 5 
Belgium 460 18 100 61 27 16 75 / 21 / 13 
Denmark 1249 28 (16) 57 38 26 21 117 / 108 / 31 
Finland 254 8 87 27 15 7 27 / 24 / 7 
France 2637 54 128 101 68 54 330 / 263 / 74 
Germany 3815 83 (40) 125 101 88 73 407 / 150 / 76 
Greece 267 18 422 15 4 2 79 / 36 / 3 
Ireland 291 8 87 31 10 7 46 / 41 / 5 
Italy 525  107 69 32 26 76 / 70 / 26 
Luxembourg 115 10 47 13 8 4 14 / 12 / 4 
Netherlands 1931 36 91 59 38 28 110 / 97 / 40 
Portugal 93 6 35 11 8 7 62 / 38 / 4 
Spain 1043 54 (23) 98 58 39 26 93 / 63 / 38 
Sweden 1049 28 73 50 34 24 110 / 64 / 30 
UK 2913 68 (20) 106 67 45 36 671 / 253 / 101  
EC 6384 n.a. 140 134 112 95 440 / 299 / 1623 
1 Sector allocable ODA commitments 2004 (excl. imputed student cost), source: OECD - IDS online (DAC
  database) 
2 ODA commitments 2003 excluding debt relief and humanitarian assistance 
3 Including debt relief and humanitarian assistance 
Source: calculations based on AFD 2006 and OECD 2006a 
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Such a discussion would not be necessary if forward information about each others plans for 
new aid activities was available. As some donors have still difficulty in providing these data 
(OECD 2006e), a case by case approach may be more practical at present. In the longer run, a 
database on planned aid allocations could be envisaged.  
5.2.2 Joint analysis and strategy for EU “darling” countries 
In addition to the general assessment of individual geographic concentration, EU donors 
should specifically address the limited number of cases in which there is substantial overlap in 
their choice of partner countries (see tables 7 and 8). These countries can be called EU “dar-
ling” countries.  
As the aim of a better division of labour is the reduction of the number of donors doing the 
same, it is most appropriate in this context to define “darling” countries as countries with a 
high presence of donors. The alternative definition of “darlings” used in the context of the 
optimal aid allocation debate is less useful for a division of labour. As it defines “darlings” as 
countries receiving a higher volume of external assistance than prescribed by an allocation 
model, donors would first have to agree on such a model. While this would be a difficult and 
time-consuming task, the resulting list would not even address the question of donor presence 
which is crucial for a division of labour. Furthermore, the aid allocation debate emphasises 
that some countries receive high volumes of aid because they perform well which does not 
imply that they should receive less aid. In fact, the World Bank / OECD proposal for early 
scaling-up even focuses on the “darling” countries Mozambique, Tanzania, Rwanda, Ghana 
and Burkina Faso (OECD 2006b). Therefore, an EU strategy for “darling” countries should 
start with an analysis of overlapping EU donor presence. An analysis of the appropriate aid 
level could be part of a country-specific analysis in a later stage.  
 
Table 6: Geographic concentration of EU-10 donors 
 ODA 2004 (USD mio) Number of Priority Countries 
Cyprus 5 5 
Czech Republic 108 8 
Estonia 5 4 
Hungary 55 5 
Latvia 8 3 
Lithuania 9 6 
Malta 10 6 
Poland 118 6 
Slovak Republic 28 7 
Slovenia 31 6 
Source: Bucar / Plibersek / Mesic 2006 (see annex 1) 
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Chart 2 shows that the number of countries with many EU donors is limited, whether one 
looks at the priority countries according to the political statements of a donor or the countries 
in which a donor commits more than 5 million USD annually as an indicator for substantial 
aid activities.26 While it is difficult to say precisely how many donors would actually be a rea-
sonable number (this may vary by country), it seems obvious that the presence of six and 
more EU donors in relatively small developing countries is not an optimal number (in particu-
lar when keeping in mind the number of other bi- and multilateral donors).  
While a large number of donors leads to high transaction costs in all countries, the relative 
importance of the problem depends on the size of the country, the capacity of the government 
and the modalities how aid is delivered. For example, a large number of donors is less of a 
problem in Viet Nam, a country with a population of 82 million and a low proportion of ODA 
to GNI and to government expenditure, than in Mozambique, a country with a population of 
19 million where ODA is a high proportion of GNI and government expenditure. 
As the choice of partner countries is based on a range of political considerations, it may be 
difficult to start a process to reduce the number of donors simultaneously in all 36 countries 
listed in table 7. It seems more feasible to adopt a learning approach starting with a small 
number of countries (for example, four to six), in which relatively quick agreement seems 
possible. This might be the case for countries in which donors have little other motivations 
than poverty reduction and in which the cost of the presence of a large number of EU donors 
                                                 
26  However, in a few cases the countries receiving more than 5 million USD of annual ODA commitments 
from many EU donors are not identical with the countries many EU donors consider as priority countries. 
They are included in table 7 in italics. Possible reasons are recent changes in priorities or specific political 
motivations. 
Chart 2: Geographic overlap of EU-15 
 
Source: calculations based on OECD 2006a; AFD 2006 
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is particularly high (high ratio of ODA to GNI, of ODA to government expenditure and of EU 
ODA to total ODA received by the country). 
A pilot strategy for a small number of “darling” countries could be elaborated in the following 
steps: 
1. Agreement on procedure and selection of countries.  
2. Discussion if the total amount of aid allocated by all donors is appropriate for these 
countries.  
3. Each EU donor should analyse its interests in these countries and state whether it 
would prefer to maintain, reduce (including offer to exit completely) or increase its 
involvement in the country (in terms of amounts allocated).  
4. Co-ordinated action: In a joint meeting, possibilities for co-ordinated action should be 
discussed. A certain target amount of EU aid could be met with a reduced number of 
donors if, for example, a donor reduces its activities in partner country A and in-
creases its activities in partner country B while another donor increases its activities in 
A and reduces B (package solution).27 Another possibility would be to focus addi-
tional aid amounts resulting from the scaling-up process: donors could concentrate 
additional funds on a few countries in a co-ordinated way. Any such strategy should 
be discussed with the partner countries concerned and be clearly communicated to the 
public as an exercise of improving the division of labour within the EU, not as a with-
drawal of individual donors. 
The Commission should participate in this process, even if its policy of global presence pre-
cludes an exit from a country. It could adapt the amount of funding and the type of activities 
as part of a joint EU strategy. 
                                                 
27  This option takes the current practice of Sweden and Norway of delegating the country programmes in Ma-
lawi and Mali a step further. 
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Table 7: Indicators for EU-15 “darling” countries (presence of 6 or more EU-15 donors) 
 
Priority 
country 
for x 
EU-15 
donors1  
Core 
prio. 
coun-
try1  
Number of 
EU-15 with 
ODA > 5 m 
USD (aver. 
2003/4)2 
ODA/ 
capita 
2004 
(USD)3 
ODA/ 
GNI 
2004 
(%)3 
ODA/ 
gov. ex-
penditure 
2004 (%)4 
EU-15 + 
EC / total 
ODA 
2004 
(%)5 
Popula-
tion 
2004 
(Mio)6 
GNI per 
capita 
2004 
(USD)6 
Mozambique 13 13  12 63 21 88 47 19 250
Palestinian 
Adm. Areas 
12 8  10 324* n.a.* 58 4 1120*
Ethiopia 11 10  9 19 17 79 37 70 110
Viet Nam 11 10  10 22 4 17 30 82 550
Tanzania 10 10  10 42 14 77 44 37 330
Uganda 10 9  9 37 15 64 37 26 270
Kenya 9 8  8 15 3 14 47 32 460
Rwanda 9 7  7 48 23 78 33 8 220
South Africa 9 7  10 14* 0,3* 1* 77 46 3630
Nicaragua 9 6  8 124 15 103 63 6 790
Albania 9 5  4 115 5 69 3 2080
Mali 8 6  4 43 12 49 50 12 360
Senegal 8 5  6 59 9 29 64 10 670
Burkina Faso 7 7  6 46 12 49 52 12 360
Eritrea 7 7  2 37 17 53 31 4 180
Zambia 7 6  7 61 14 48 60 11 450
Bolivia 7 4  8 85 9 32* 32 9 960
Afghanistan 7 4  10 67 32 289* 31 n.a. 212
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
7 3  8 161 7 20* 46 4 2040
Egypt 6 5  6 20* 2* 37 69 1310
Burundi 6 5  3 22 25 88 65 7 90
Cape Verde 6 4  3 263 14 65 0.5 1770
Namibia 6 4  5 89* 3* 80 2 2370
Sudan 6 3  5 6 1 18 45 34 530
Bangladesh 6 3  5 9 2 19 29 140 440
Cambodia 6 3  6 34 10 67 25 14 320
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
6 3  11 129 4 62 8 2620
China 4 2 10 1* 0.1 40 1296 1500
India 3 2 9 1 0 1 31 1080 620
Angola 4 3 7 18 2 10 84 15 930
Iraq 5 2 6 n.a. n.a. 6 n.a. n.a.
Congo DR 3 3 6 14 12 592 62 56 110
Colombia 3 0 6 11* 0.5 2* 19 45 2020
Indonesia 4 2 6 0 0 0.2* 18 218 1140
Sri Lanka 5 2 6 25 3 17 19 1010
Phillipines 2 2 6 6* 0.5  24 82 1170
1 Source: calculations based on AFD 2006 
2 ODA commitments excl. debt and humanitarian assist. (source: calculations based on OECD 2006a) 
3 Net ODA excl. debt and hum. ass. (source: OECD 2006f) 
4 Total net ODA (source: Moss / Subramanian 2005) 
5 Total ODA commitments (source: calculations based on OECD 2006a)  
6 Source: OECD 2006a 
* Source: World Development Indicators 2006 (total net ODA) 
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5.2.3 Joint EU strategy for “orphan” countries in the context of the DAC fragile states 
group 
The EU should embed any initiative on “orphan” countries in the context of the work in the 
DAC fragile states group and not start a parallel process. It could participate in donor-wide 
meetings with a joint response strategy.  
The DAC fragile states group has identified a limited number of aid “orphans” that should 
receive more ODA (see table 9). In some of these countries, the EU is of particular impor-
tance in terms of its share in total aid provided and its presence. The DAC defines “orphans” 
in terms of volume of aid. As these countries have weak governance capacities, it would be 
difficult for them to deal with a large number of donors (OECD 2006f).28 The number of EU 
donors in these countries varies and should not be increased. EU donors could discuss for 
individual countries whether the Commission or a specific member state should play a key 
role in these “orphan” countries.  
As countries with little aid flows can quickly become “darling” countries in the sense of a 
large donor presence when the political situation changes (e.g. DRC), the EU could pay par-
ticular attention to a joint response strategy for “new” partner countries based on a limited 
number of donors. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28  On the other hand, if there are few donors, the predictability of their aid is important in order to reduce the 
volatility of aid flows currently experienced by these countries (OECD 2006d). 
Table 8: Priority countries of EU-10 (presence of 3 or more EU-10 donors) 
 EU-10 EU-15 
Moldova 6 4 
Palestinian Adm. Areas 4 12 
Serbia and Montenegro 4 6 
Ukraine 4 2 
Afghanistan 3 7 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 7 
Viet Nam 3 11 
Georgia 3 5 
In italics: EU-10 priority countries with an additional presence of 6 or more EU-15 donors 
Source: Bucar / Plibersek / Mesic 2006 (see annex 1) 
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6 Cross-sector division of labour  
Even though it is undisputed that the sectoral allocation of aid should ultimately be deter-
mined by the development strategy of each partner country, this does not imply that every 
donor has to be able to offer the same sectoral expertise. A stronger concentration of donors 
on certain sectors could reduce administrative costs and improve sectoral expertise through 
“economies of scale”. Therefore, the GAERC (2006, 5) recommended that for cross-sector 
division of labour, “Member States and the Commission should deepen the self-assessments 
of their comparative advantages and relative strengths”. Whereas in the past donors have 
often concentrated on the same sectors, it would be important that the services offered by 
them as a whole actually correspond to the variety of needs.  
It should be a guiding principle for a cross-sector division of labour that the EU as a whole 
should be able to provide all kinds of thematic, sectoral and instrumental development opera-
tions but individual donors may specialise on specific expertise. For example, poverty reduc-
tion requires not only basic social services, but also measures to improve the productive ca-
pacities of the poor and their access to infrastructure. Furthermore, without protection of the 
environment, poverty reduction will not be sustainable. Thus, calls from NGOs to focus on 
basic social services (education, health) should be applied to the EU as a whole and not to 
each individual donor because a high focus of all EU donors on basic social services would 
not be an efficient approach to poverty reduction. Another example for this principle would be 
new fields of activities like general budget support. Even if this instrument has many advan-
tages, this does not imply that all EU donors should focus on it, as other kinds of aid are also 
important to promote development. If the EU is perceived as a whole, inefficient pressures on 
individual donors to specialise along the same lines will be reduced. 
The cross-sector division of labour among EU donors could be improved through a co-
ordinated concentration process. As this will take time, a division of labour approach could be 
applied immediately for new and rapidly growing fields of development co-operation, like, 
Table 9: EU presence in “orphan” countries identified by the DAC  
 Priority country for 
x EU-15 donors 
EU-15 donors > 5m 
(average ODA 
com-mitments 
2003/4 excl. hum. 
and debt) 
EU (EU-15 + EC) / 
total ODA commit-
ments 2004 (%) 
EC / total ODA 
commitments 2004 
Burundi 6 3 65  30  
DRC 3 6 62  10  
Guinea 2 2 48  4  
Nigeria 4 3 64  43 
Uzbekistan 1 1 11  5  
Yemen 4 4 44  6  
Source: calculations based on AFD 2006; OECD 2006a 
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for example, adjustment to climate change.29 Thus, an inefficient build-up of identical compe-
tences can be avoided.  
6.1 Recommendation for the EU: Analyse and expand areas of strength in a co-
ordinated way  
Each EU donor should analyse individually the relative importance of sectors compared to its 
commitments to other sectors and to its political goals30 as well as in comparison to other 
European donors in the same sector. They should identify sectors in which they would like to 
expand and sectors where they might be willing to reduce their own activities. Each donor 
should build on its particular strengths rather than build new competences in areas where 
other donors already show good performance. On this basis, EU donors should discuss a co-
herent approach of concrete steps towards more sectoral concentration while maintaining the 
diversity of expertise for the EU as a whole. Such an approach could include delegated co-
operation and a clear communication strategy to ensure that this concentration is not misun-
derstood as a decreased political importance of certain sectors for an individual donor. 
An improvement of the sectoral division of labour can be addressed in parallel to in-country 
processes of sectoral specialisation. These processes will over time lead to some concentra-
tion, but are not co-ordinated and are therefore not a sufficient approach to achieve “econo-
mies of scale” on the donor side. An analysis of the aggregated sectoral priorities of each do-
nor leading to some co-ordinated regional or global specialisation could speed up in-country 
concentration processes by reducing the overlap in the offers made by donors to partner coun-
tries.  
The data on the sectoral distribution of ODA commitments show that the relative importance 
of sectors varies for each donor (see chart 3). There seems to be room to build on these pat-
terns to further increase sectoral concentration. However, an assessment of possibilities for 
sectoral specialisation should be more detailed than the data used in chart 3 and 4 (three-digit 
DAC code), which can serve as a first step to identify sectors for further analysis. Within a 
sector, attention should be paid to specific types of intervention (e.g. using the five-digit CRS 
code). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29  Another example could be migration. 
30  The sectoral analysis focusses on inputs, not on impacts. For example, the water sector can contribute to 
improving health. 
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Chart 3: ODA commitments 2004 by sectors as a percentage of total sector-allocable ODA of each 
 donor (EU-15 and EC) 
 
 
Source: OECD - IDS online (DAC database) 
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Chart 4: ODA commitments 2004 by sector (EU-15 and EC) 
 
Source: OECD - IDS online (DAC database) 
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6.2 Recommendation for the EU: Joint strategy for new fields of development 
co-operation – the example of climate change 
Adaptation to climate change is a new field of development co-operation in which a division 
of labour approach should be applied from the start on. The issue has not yet received suffi-
cient attention in the field of development co-operation although it jeopardises progress in 
poverty reduction. Least developed countries will carry a disproportionate large share of the 
costs occasioned by the impacts of climate change. An increasing proportion of world emis-
sions of greenhouse gases will come from dynamic emerging economies such as China and 
India. A strategy for adjustment to climate change should be combined with a strategy for 
mitigation of climate change. ODA funds are currently concentrated on mitigation activities, 
including the promotion of energy efficiency and renewable energies as well as creating an 
enabling environment for projects under the Clean Development Mechanism.  
In the area of adaptation to climate change, basic conceptual and strategic work has been 
elaborated by a group of multi- and bilateral donors as well as by the OECD (ADB et al. 
2003; OECD 2005b), but still needs to be refined substantially for many sectors (e.g. agricul-
ture/rural development, water, disaster risk management, health and infrastructure) and re-
gions (WBGU 2007). As this is an enormous challenge due to the complexity of the issues, a 
division of labour between all interested donors could significantly enhance the impact of the 
scarce intellectual and financial resources in this field.  
Mitigation includes the promotion of energy efficiency, renewable energies, as well as the 
reduction of emissions due to land use change and deforestation. Activities in the first two 
areas of work are most effective in countries with a large and growing energy demand, e.g. 
India and China. These countries are most likely to be interested in cooperating with donors 
which have a strong domestic and international profile in these two areas, with regard to pol-
icy regulations, research and development and technological solutions. The third area of work 
is particularly important in developing countries with tropical forest areas, especially from 
Latin America and Africa. Donors with a strong profile regarding biodiversity protection, 
sustainable forestry and agriculture could engage here. 
7 Conclusion 
The study developed proposals how the GAERC guiding principles could be implemented 
and how the EU could advance towards a division of labour in development co-operation. 
These recommendations refer to in-country, cross-country and cross-sector division of labour. 
For in-country division of labour: 
— use division of labour exercises as part of EU joint programming; 
— implement good practices specified in a code of conduct.  
For cross-country division of labour: 
— review geographic concentration individually by benchmarking against other donors of 
similar size, exchange views on good practices and appropriate levels of concentration 
and consult other donors before leaving a country (to avoid the creation of new “or-
phans”); 
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— develop a joint strategy for “darling” countries where many EU donors are present, aim-
ing at a reduction of the number of EU donors; 
— develop a joint strategy for “orphan” countries to increase ODA levels without increasing 
the number of EU donors. 
For cross-sector division of labour:  
— analyse and expand areas of strength in a co-ordinated way; 
— use a division of labour approach in new fields of development co-operation. 
It would be best to address these dimensions of division of labour simultaneously, as they are 
linked and progress in one dimension is limited by progress in the other dimensions. Because 
of the ongoing joint assistance strategy and EU joint programming processes, there is a win-
dow of opportunity to achieve quick progress in the dimension of in-country division of la-
bour. Nevertheless, a reduction of the overlap of EU donors in the cross-country and cross-
sector dimension will simplify and facilitate in-country processes of division of labour. The 
ownership of the partner countries is not reduced if EU donors – being part of a political en-
tity – make proposals how they could reorganise their aid activities. 
This integrated approach to division of labour could be applied immediately to additional re-
sources (scaling-up) and then be expanded over time to the current aid activities.  
In order to move beyond policy statements and achieve real progress on the ground, the EU 
should agree on concrete activities in all three dimensions of a division of labour and monitor 
their implementation. 
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Annex 1:  
Development Policies of New Member States and their Participation in 
European Union Development Co-operation (Summary)1 
 
 
 
Prepared by2: Maja Bucar, Eva Plibersek, Anja Mesic 
Centre of International Relations; Faculty of Social Sciences 
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia 
 
 
Approach 
Until the accession to the EU, many of the new member states (NMS) were themselves 
recipients of donor funds (some still are) and therefore less involved in development coop-
eration policies. Their new status requires a different attitude in this area. To participate 
fully in the activities at the level of the European Commission and to contribute to the ef-
fectiveness of EU aid, these countries first have to develop their development policies and 
strategies, raise the awareness among their citizens and engage in different development 
cooperation projects. In order to answer the question of optimal division of labour within 
development cooperation in a country and cross-country from the viewpoint of new mem-
ber states, one needs to examine closely the current state of affairs in these countries.  
The study analysed the current development policies of the 10 new member states, which 
joined the EU in May 2004: the legal and institutional framework, the setting of develop-
ment cooperation priorities and statistical information. It is based on available official 
documents and to some extent on interviews with experts in the countries themselves.  
The limitations of the research were several. The short time frame available contributed to 
the fact that little information was obtained directly from the contacts in the countries. An-
other common observation is the lack of systematic monitoring of development policies in 
these countries, resulting from the fact that this is a new area of activity, which by itself is 
going through development period as well, both in terms of institutions as well as person-
nel. In addition, our preliminary search shows serious problems with data in English (there 
would be documentation available in national language, which could not be used). More 
conclusive assumptions would therefore require additional work and verification of find-
ings within the countries. Therefore, this analysis should be treated as preliminary work in 
this rather complex field, focusing as much on the content as on identification of the prob-
lems of doing such research. 
Findings 
The data available reflects an intensified activity in the area of development cooperation 
within all of the new member states. Even though in financial terms, the budget allocations 
are still far below the desired level of 0.17% (the goal for 2010), we can observe intensi-
fied activity in institutionalisation of development cooperation, in setting a functioning 
                                                 
1 The full version will be published separately. 
2 We gratefully acknowledge the support of Maja Gracar and Marjan Huc in collecting relevant information.. 
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legal framework and developing a set of criteria for the selection of recipient countries as 
well as channels through which to execute development aid programmes. 
New member states have an interesting list of main recipient countries, with pronounced 
priority given to neighbouring non-EU member countries or ex-Soviet countries, where 
they have comparative advantage in better comprehension of state of affairs due to their 
own historical experience. This, in combination with their own learning process, experi-
enced during the accession period, gives them ample opportunity to provide these countries 
with training and consultancy in the area of democratisation, market liberalisation, adjust-
ing legal, institutional and regulatory framework to the EU standards – in short, transition 
expertise. The available evidence suggests that several of the on-going development pro-
jects are of this nature.  
More difficult for the NMS is the development cooperation with developing countries, 
especially with the least developed ones. Here, the assistance of the EU in designing the 
instruments, which would help donor countries to develop their policies, would be benefi-
cial. The EU should provide capacity building support to enable the NMS to play an active 
role within the EU aid. From the programmes and strategies it is obvious that NMS are 
committed to increase the financial allocation as well. However, they are lacking the ex-
perience in some areas of development aid implementation.  
With respect to the in-country division of labour, we can observe in the cases of NMS that 
they have so far limited number of sectors or themes in each partner country. Further, sev-
eral countries are already discussing further concentration of development cooperation due 
to limited resources available. On the other hand, several countries mention expansion of 
bilateral aid in the future. The first increase in the resources dedicated to development co-
operation was in many instances the result of contribution to the overall EU budget and 
thus considered as multilateral aid. The NMS strategies seem to indicate a desire to chan-
nel some of the required and planned increase in allocation of resources towards bilateral 
aid. Here we notice some controversy between more selectivity and concentration on one 
hand and increased bilateral activity on the other.  
A timely division of labour approach at the EU level could be valuable in preventing 
spreading of the planned increased aid coming from NMS too thinly. On the other hand, 
one of the specific sector priorities, which is high priority in NMS and is based on their 
comparative advantages (due to their own recent historical experience), is the regulative 
and institutional transition process from centralised planned economy to market economy 
and acquis communautaire: here there is no doubt that NMS could provide a lead. 
Within the available policy documents the use of delegated co-operation arrangements is 
not yet mentioned, neither in the sense of participating in an arrangement like this or offer-
ing to coordinate one. In fact, the cooperation issue is more present in some countries in 
relation to non-EU countries (Canada, Norway) than with other EU members. The very 
novelty of acting as a donor country could be one of the explanations. 
Looking at the priority countries, we can observe that while some countries overlap with 
the priorities of the “old” member states (Palestinian Adm. Areas, Albania, Bosnia & Her-
zegovina, Afghanistan, Iraq), NMS channel their development aid to several other coun-
tries in their neighbourhood or with similar historic experience, yet still seriously lagging 
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in development (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Moldova, Georgia, for example).  
With this in mind, the cooperation of NMS and an eventual joint strategy for these coun-
tries may be one of the options within the context of division of labour.  
In further discussions and design of policies on the division of labour between donors one 
needs to clearly observe the principles of equal participation in the policy making for all, 
old and new donors. The fact that current level of development cooperation is relatively 
low should not be taken on board as a reason not to involve NMS in the planning of future 
strategies at the EU level. A careful assessment of potential advantages of NMS being a 
donor in a particular sector/ country is required on one hand, and the options of coopera-
tion arrangements on equal footing in certain cases promoted. 
Since the role of a donor country is a relatively new experience for NMS, one should not 
underestimate the need for awareness-raising on the development issues in these countries. 
The EU vision on development with key objectives, values and principles of development 
cooperation should be promoted through proper media to the citizens of NMS, and wider 
participation of development NGOs in these countries encouraged. Only wider public sup-
port to development cooperation will enable the governments to allocate increased finan-
cial and human resources to these issues. 
An overview of the current state of affairs in the area of development cooperation in new 
member states is presented in the following table.  
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Annex 2: Priority Countries of EU-15 
 
Priority Countries of EU-15 (1 = core priority country, 2 = other priority country)
Aus Bel Den Fin Fra Ger Gre Ire Ita Lux Net Por Spa Swe UK Sum 1 Sum 2 Total
AFRICA
NORTH OF SAHARA
Algeria 1 1 2 1 3 1 4
Egypt  1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 6
Morocco 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 5
Tunisia 1 2 1 2 1 3 2 5
SOUTH OF SAHARA
Angola 1 1 1 2 3 1 4
Benin 1 1 1 1 1 5 0 5
Botswana 0 0 0
Burkina Faso 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 0 7
Burundi 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 3 6
Cameroon 1 1 2 2 1 3
Cape Verde 1 1 1 2 1 1 5 1 6
Central African Rep. 1 1 0 1
Chad 1 2 1 1 2
Comoros 1 1 0 1
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1 1 1 3 0 3
Congo, Rep. 1 2 1 1 2
Côte d'Ivoire 1 2 2 1 2 3
Djibouti 1 1 0 1
Equatorial Guinea 1 2 1 1 2
Eritrea 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 4 3 7
Ethiopia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 10 1 11
Gabon 1 1 0 1
Gambia 1 2 1 1 2
Ghana 1 1 1 1 1 5 0 5
Guinea 1 2 1 1 2
Guinea-Bissau 1 1 2 2 1 3
Kenya 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 7 2 9
Lesotho 2 1 1 2 1 3
Liberia 1 2 1 1 2
Madagascar 1 2 1 1 2
Malawi 1 1 1 3 0 3
Mali 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 6 2 8
Mauritania 1 2 1 2 1 3
Mauritius 0 0 0
Mayotte 0 0 0
Mozambique 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 0 13
Namibia 2 1 1 1 1 2 4 2 6
Niger 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 5
Nigeria 2 1 2 1 2 2 4
Rwanda 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 7 2 9
Sao Tome & Principe 1 2 1 2 2 2 4
Senegal 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 5 3 8
Seychelles 0 0 0
Sierra Leone 1 1 2 0 2
Somalia 1 2 1 1 2
South Africa 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 6 3 9
St. Helena 0 0 0
Sudan 2 1 1 1 2 1 4 2 6
Swaziland 0 0 0
Tanzania 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 1 10
Togo 1 1 0 1
Uganda 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 0 10
Zambia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 0 7
Zimbabwe 2 1 2 1 2 2 4
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Aus Bel Den Fin Fra Ger Gre Ire Ita Lux Net Por Spa Swe UK Sum 1 Sum 2 Total
AMERICA
NORTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA
Anguilla 0 0 0
Antigua and Barbuda 0 0 0
Barbados 0 0 0
Belize 2 0 1 1
Costa Rica 2 2 0 2 2
Cuba 1 2 2 1 2 3
Dominica 0 0 0
Dominican Republic 1 2 1 2 1 3
El Salvador 2 1 1 1 3 1 4
Grenada 0 0 0
Guatemala 2 2 2 1 1 3 4
Haiti 1 1 2 0 2
Honduras 1 1 1 2 3 1 4
Jamaica 2 0 1 1
Mexico 2 2 0 2 2
Montserrat 0 0 0
Nicaragua 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 8 1 9
Panama 2 0 1 1
St. Kitts-Nevis 0 0 0
St. Lucia 0 0 0
St. Vincent and Grenadines 0 0 0
Trinidad & Tobago 0 0 0
Turks & Caicos Islands 0 0 0
SOUTH AMERICA
Argentina 2 0 1 1
Bolivia 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 6 1 7
Brazil 2 2 2 0 3 3
Chile 2 2 0 2 2
Colombia 2 2 2 0 3 3
Ecuador 1 2 2 1 2 2 4
Guyana 2 0 1 1
Paraguay 2 1 1 1 2
Peru 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 5
Suriname 1 1 2 0 2
Uruguay 2 0 1 1
Venezuela 2 0 1 1
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Aus Bel Den Fin Fra Ger Gre Ire Ita Lux Net Por Spa Swe UK Sum 1 Sum 2 Total
ASIA
MIDDLE EAST
Bahrain 0 0 0
Iran 0 0 0
Iraq 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 5
Jordan 2 1 2 2 1 3 4
Lebanon 1 1 2 2 1 3
Oman 0 0 0
Palestinian Adm. Areas 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 8 4 12
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0
Syria 2 1 2 1 2 3
Yemen 1 1 1 2 3 1 4
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
Afghanistan 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 4 7
Armenia 2 1 2 2 1 3 4
Azerbaijan 2 0 1 1
Bangladesh 1 1 1 2 1 1 5 1 6
Bhutan 1 1 2 0 2
Georgia 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 5
India 2 1 1 2 1 3
Kazakhstan 2 2 0 2 2
Kyrgyz Rep. 2 1 2 1 2 3
Maldives 0 0 0
Myanmar 2 0 1 1
Nepal 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 5
Pakistan 2 1 2 1 2 2 4
Sri Lanka 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 5
Tajikistan 2 1 2 1 2 3
Turkmenistan 0 0 0
Uzbekistan 2 0 1 1
FAR EAST ASIA 
Cambodia 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 3 6
China 1 2 2 1 2 2 4
Indonesia 2 1 1 2 2 2 4
Korea, Dem.Rep. 0 0 0
Laos 1 2 1 1 3 1 4
Malaysia 0 0 0
Mongolia 2 2 0 2 2
Philippines 1 1 2 0 2
Thailand 2 2 0 2 2
Timor-Leste 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 5
Viet Nam 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 10 1 11
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Aus Bel Den Fin Fra Ger Gre Ire Ita Lux Net Por Spa Swe UK Sum 1 Sum 2 Total
EUROPE
Albania 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 5 4 9
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 4 3 7
Croatia 1 2 1 1 2
Macedonia/FYROM 1 1 1 1 2 4 1 5
Moldova 1 2 1 2 2 2 4
Serbia & Montenegro 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 6
Turkey 1 1 2 0 2
OCEANIA
Cook Islands 0 0 0
Fiji 0 0 0
Kiribati 0 0 0
Marshall Islands 0 0 0
Micronesia, Fed. States 0 0 0
Nauru 0 0 0
Niue 0 0 0
Palau 0 0 0
Papua New Guinea 0 0 0
Samoa 0 0 0
Solomon Islands 0 0 0
Tokelau 0 0 0
Tonga 0 0 0
Tuvalu 0 0 0
Vanuatu 1 1 0 1
Wallis & Futuna 0 0 0
Source: AFD 2006, EC 2006a: 67
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Annex 3: Division of Labour Exercises in the Context of JAS (Documents) 
 
 
1. Tasks of Lead Donors (and Active/Delegating Donors) 
 
 
a) Zambia 
Envisioned Lead CP tasks 
On behalf of all the CPs interested in the given sector the Lead CP will:  
Vis-à-vis the lead sector ministry: 
Act as interface for policy dialogue between GRZ and CPs 
— On a day-to-day basis, keep track of key developments in the sector3, and support as 
appropriate the Government in driving the sector dialogue on the policy implications of 
these. This includes representing the CPs in the Sector Advisory Groups and in any other 
fora, where the sector development is discussed and planned; 
— Provide in-country advocacy in support of agreed international development goals rele-
vant to the specific sector; 
— Together with GRZ plan and coordinate reviews and evaluations in the sector aligned to 
the GRZ planning and budget cycle; 
— With the GRZ organise and facilitate annual sector performance and policy discussions 
with the CPs that have an interest in the sector. These discussions will review the sector 
performance, key policy and implementation challenges; 
Facilitate government management of financial and technical assistance. 
— Assist GRZ in developing, establishing and/or managing appropriate joint aid mecha-
nisms in the sector including for example SWAps, basket funding, and pools for TA 
etc. This includes planning of any new aid interventions; 
— Act as channel of funds (silent partnerships) for other CPs as agreed and appropriate; 
— Ensure that MoUs, formats and formal descriptions of joint procedures are available 
as appropriate in the sector; 
— Assist GRZ in assessing the need for donor support in the sector and in facilitating 
appropriate division of labour (among CPs) in the sector. This includes facilitating 
that the work of CPs is aligned with the NDP and GRZ sector plans and that CPs 
complement rather than duplicate each other; 
Vis-à-vis the other cooperating partners interested in the sector: 
— Provide coordination services including convening, preparing and recording CP coor-
dination meetings; 
— Build consensus around, finalise and submit joint CP positions for the appropriate 
sector dialogue mechanisms (including SAGs); 
                                                 
3 This does not mean that the Lead CP should duplicate the National Development Plan monitoring system. Instead the 
Lead CP should be on a day-to-day basis closely follow the outcomes of the NDP monitoring system and respond to 
the monitoring results as appropriate. 
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— Ensure alignment of CP activities (including external reviews and missions) to GRZ 
planning and budgeting cycle; 
— Information management. This includes ensuring (in cooperation with GRZ) that all 
relevant information concerning the sector is readily available, updated and commu-
nicated to other CPs both regularly and on request; 
Monitor harmonisation performance 
— Report annually to the CPs and GRZ about the Lead CP activities carried out and the 
performance of the CP community in the sector in terms of following an aligned and 
harmonised approach4, as defined by the so-called Paris indicators. This includes 
presenting recommendations for revised division of labour, aid modalities, approach 
of CPs, and any needed revisions of the ToR. 
(…) 
The role of non-lead CPs 
Some of the non-lead CPs will provide aid in the sector in question and will do so in a-
lignment with GRZ plans and in co-ordination with the Lead CPs. As the Lead CPs will be 
acting on behalf of the non-lead CPs in the sector the non-leads will aim to be as "silent" as 
at all possible and delegate the management of their aid intervention to the lead CPs to the 
extent possible.  
This includes that there are a number of tasks that the non-lead CPs should refrain from 
doing:  
— The non-lead CPs should not initiate project or aid interventions in the sector without 
co-ordinating with the lead CPs. 
— The non-lead CPs should not approach or engage GRZ in discussions about sector 
related issues without co-ordinating with the lead CPs. 
— The non-lead CPs should not initiate or plan reviews, evaluations, assessments or 
other studies in the sector without co-ordinating with the lead CPs. 
(Source: JASZ Working Group 2005, 3ff)  
 
b) Tanzania 
In order to achieve a more even engagement of Development Partners in sectors and the-
matic areas and reduce transaction costs for both the Government and Development Part-
ners, Development Partners will rationalise the number of sectors or cross-cutting/thematic 
areas that they engage in. At the same time, the number of Development Partners that are 
‘active’ in a sector or thematic area will be limited to an appropriate level, depending on 
the needs and capacity of the sector/thematic area. Development Partners outside a particu-
lar sector/thematic area will be represented by those Partners that are ‘active’ in the area of 
concern and will assume the role of ‘delegating partners’. They can nevertheless provide 
assistance to any sector/thematic area within a framework of delegated co-operation, as 
                                                 
4 Parts of the monitoring could be left to an independent monitoring unit as discussed in the JASZ roadmap. 
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division of labour does not concern the amount or distribution of Development Partner 
support. 
At a second level of division of labour, ‘lead partners’ will be appointed in each sector, 
thematic area and, where necessary, sub-sector to lead and coordinate other Partners that 
are active in that area in all matters. Depending on the case, the role of ‘lead partner’ may 
be rotated among different Partners that engage in a particular sector/thematic area. In ad-
dition, responsibility can be delegated to different Partners for administering or carrying 
out specific activities (e.g. analytic work, monitoring and evaluation) or guiding specific 
aspects of dialogue within the area of concern.  
‘Active’ Development Partners in a sector/thematic area will represent others in sec-
tor/thematic dialogue with the Government, whereby ‘lead partners’ will act as focal point 
in communication with the Government. They will timely share all relevant information 
among each other and with ‘delegating’ Development Partners and assure that the views of 
‘delegating partners’ are equally heard and reflected in the position presented to the Gov-
ernment. Development Partners aim to reach a consensus among themselves and present 
consolidated views to the Government, but also report existing divergent opinions where 
consensus cannot be attained.  
Within and across sectors and thematic areas, Development Partners harmonise their ac-
tivities, funding decisions, requirements, analytic work, meetings, missions, reviews and 
other processes and align them to Government strategies, systems and processes. As part of 
division of labour arrangements, terms of reference including a code of conduct for dele-
gated co-operation and harmonisation arrangements will specify the roles and responsibili-
ties of ’lead’, ‘active’ and ‘delegating’ partners.  
(Source: United Republic of Tanzania 2006, 13) 
 
c) Uganda 
Leading Development Partner: In any given sector/area, there are ranges of leadership 
functions that can be taken on by DPs. This may be undertaken by one or more partners. 
Functions include acting as the main liaison with Government in policy dialogue and ad-
vocacy. The role of the lead development partner will depend on the agreements reached 
with government and other development partners in the sector/area, but may include the 
following: acting as the main liaison with Government in policy dialogue and advocacy, 
facilitating funds and aid management, ensuring that joint reviews, monitoring and report-
ing take place following agreed formats, providing services to other development partners 
(information, communication and technical advice) and/or monitoring development part-
ners’ performance. Some of these functions are currently managed by the Chairs of DP 
sector/thematic groups.  
Actively Engaged Development Partner: A Development Partner that continues active in-
volvement in some areas, such as reporting or financing, in a given sector. Engaged devel-
opment partners in a sector/thematic area can represent others in sector/thematic dialogue 
with the Government. They share all relevant information among each other and with 
“delegating” DPs and assure that the views of “delegating partners” are equally heard and 
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reflected in the positions presented to the Government. (See Leading Development Part-
ner).  
Delegated partnership: An arrangement where one development partner (DP) devolves 
responsibilities to another DP. This can be across a range of aspects of sectoral activity but 
particularly in terms of financing and/or dialogue functions.  
(Source: Overseas Development Institute: Uganda Development Partner, Division of La-
bour Exercise, Aid Information Map, Introduction and Instructions for DP Questionnaire, 
28 July 2006, p. 3 f.)  
 
2. Criteria for Lead Donors (and Active Donors)  
a) Zambia 
Qualifications and capabilities of the Lead CPs 
The qualifications and capabilities required to be a Lead CP will depend on the sector but 
are generally expected to include: 
— Available human resources at mission level with a) high level specialist expertise, b) 
in-depth knowledge of the local Zambian conditions in the sector, c) negotiation and 
process management skills, d) understanding of the aid modalities (to be) used in the 
sector, and e) experiences with joint working relationships, moderation of inter-
institutional arrangements and managing networks. Actual staffing requirements for 
lead CPs will have to be specified within the sector context and may depend on the 
nature and scope of CP involvement in the sector, the number of lead CPs involved 
as well as the capacity constraints and institutional development needs of the sector. 
— Trust and credibility with key stakeholders, particularly GRZ, other cooperating part-
ners, and sector specific stakeholders. 
— Commitment and support at HQ level.  
— Decentralised authority enabling the field office to make decisions. 
— Other resources, including long-term financial commitment, procedural ability/-
mandate to represent others and co-ordinate wider resources. 
— Interpersonal competences of the lead CP team: communicator, convenor and facili-
tator skills 
(Source: JASZ Working Group 2005, 4 f.)  
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b) Tanzania 
The selection of the areas of focus for individual Development Partners and their roles as 
lead or delegating partners will be based on their comparative and, where applicable, com-
petitive advantage. This is determined by a Development Partner’s established interna-
tional and field office expertise, based on past successful experience, in a particular sector, 
thematic area or sub-sector. It also includes in-depth knowledge of local conditions at mis-
sion level. It does not depend on a Development Partner’s funding capacity. 
Other selection criteria to be taken into account for Development Partners’ engagement in 
sectors or thematic areas are: 
— Development Partner organisational capacity; 
— The appropriate total number of Development Partners in a sector or thematic area, 
taking into account the size, nature, needs in line with Government policies, and ca-
pacity of the sector or thematic area of concern; 
— Established relationships with Government, other Development Partners and non-
state actors;  
— Development Partners’ willingness to cooperate with each other in a particular sector 
or thematic area;  
— Development Partner headquarter mandate; 
— The extent of decentralised authority enabling field offices to make decisions; and 
— Willingness to sustain support and invest in the agency’s competencies in the long-
term. 
With regards to taking on a leading role, factors to consider in addition to the above are: 
— Development Partner organisational capacity to assume leadership; 
— Other Development Partners’ willingness to recognise and trust a Development Part-
ner as leader; and 
— The distribution of lead responsibilities among Development Partners so as to facili-
tate equitable sharing of work.  
(Source: United Republic of Tanzania 2006, 13 f.) 
 
c) Uganda 
Questionnaire: Characteristics of Development Partner: Leading DP and actively engaged 
DP (but not leading partner), Ranking: 1=very important, 5=not at all important 
1. Headquarter/Decentralisation Issues  
— Decision making is decentralised, enabling country office to make decisions on finan-
cial, operational and programming issues 
— Country office can make decisions on Policy Issues 
— There is strong Commitment and support from HQ 
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2. Financing and Systems Alignment 
— Level of funding 
— Use of joint funding modalities (baskets or BS) 
— Disbursement record (predictability and timeliness) 
— Flexibility of resources allocation 
— Experience of managing other development partners funds 
— Alignment of DP instruments with GOU Sector policies and strategies 
— Ability to undertake multi-year commitments in line with MTEF 
— Use of GOU Sector/Area reporting mechanisms and national systems 
3. Dialogue, Credibility and Historical Record 
— Dialogue skills (agency internal technical capacity) 
— Experience of joint development partner negotiation / representing other develop-
ment partners 
— Development partner characteristics (e.g. proactive, troubleshooting approach; able 
to build bridges and create/generating consensus) 
— Credibility with MFPED 
— Credibility with line ministry 
— Credibility with other development partners 
— Credibility with other key stakeholders 
— Number of years in Sector/Area 
4. Staffing and Capacity 
— Sectoral expertise in-country 
— Sectoral expertise across different countries 
— Negotiation and process management skills 
— Understanding aid modalities to be used in the Sector/Area 
— Experiences with joint working relationships 
— Moderation of inter-institutional arrangements 
— Managing networks 
— Technical Support from HQ 
5. Please specify any other resources or characteristics of a DP you consider relevant for 
this role? (Such as long-term financial commitment, procedural ability/mandate to repre-
sent others and coordinate wider resources) 
 
(Source: Overseas Development Institute: Uganda Development Partner, Division of La-
bour Exercise, Aid information map, Development Partner Questionnaire, 24th August 
2006, revised version, p. 11 f.) 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
    
3. Division of Labour Matrices 
 
a) Zambia 
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Annex 4: Nordic Plus Complementarity Principles 
— Each Nordic Plus donor will aim in principle at focusing its active involvement with 
partner governments in a maximum of three sectors which meet the following crite-
ria: 
— The partner government has formally identified the sector as a priority in its pov-
erty reduction strategy (or equivalent) 
— The Nordic Plus donor has a comparative advantage, i.e.: long experience in the 
sector and knowledge of the sector institutions; possesses technical expertise; 
has the ability and capacity to take on a lead donor role, and is trusted by the 
government and the other donors  
— The Nordic Plus donors will seek to be represented in all strategic sectors as defined 
by the partner government by a minimum of one and a maximum of three donors. 
— In each priority sector, the Nordic Plus donors will seek arrangements among all do-
nors to the sector on a lead donor arrangement between active donors that combines 
regular rotation of responsibilities with the need for continuity. Troika or similar 
shared lead donor models could be considered, with a rotation period that corre-
sponds to the length of the assignment of the responsible officer of the lead donor. 
The lead donorship role might differ due to the varying need and situation in a sector.  
— The Nordic Plus donors will be guided by the partner countries in the selection of 
sectors and division of labour. The partner countries will be encouraged to map do-
nor involvement in each sector and to identify on the basis of this and their poverty 
reduction strategies areas for increased support and areas that could be given lower 
priority. The partner countries will also be encouraged to indicate their preferences as 
to which donors should be actively involved in each sector.  
— If the sector is strategic and/or there is a financing gap the donor may enter into a 
delegated cooperation agreement with another donor and hereby delegate authority to 
the other donor to act on its behalf towards the partner government. A delegated co-
operation role in a sector can be additional to the maximum of three sectors where 
the Nordic Plus donor is engaged.  
— Nordic Plus donors will consider issues of staffing requirements as a consequence of 
a division of labour and strive to reach complementary arrangements also regarding 
staffing. Under the leadership of the partner country, field offices and headquarters 
of each of the Nordic Plus donors will work together to identify sectors in which to 
remain and propose exits from sectors from which they shall withdraw. The Princi-
ples should in no way lead to a reduction of the level of aid from any of Nordic Plus 
donor to the partner country. Increased budget support, or increased level of funding 
to a priority sector should make up for the reduction in aid to a particular sector from 
which a Nordic Plus donor exits.  
— The headquarters of the Nordic Plus donors are committed to provide endorsement 
during the process of establishment of the division of labour in order for final nego-
tiations to be concluded successfully at country level.  
— Nordic Plus donors shall aim at a long term perspective with a minimum of 5–7 
years, or a minimum of two periods of a national poverty reduction strategy, in its ac-
tive engagement in a sector 
(Source: Nordic Plus Donors 2005) 
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Annex 5: Delegated Co-operation 
1. DAC - Code of conduct 
For a lead donor: 
— Enable delegating donors to review policies, procedures and systems relevant to the 
delegated co-operation arrangement. 
— Ensure that the expectations of the delegated donors are clearly understood. 
— Assess whether it is feasible to meet the reasonable expectations of the delegating 
donors. 
— Take all opportunities to be flexible, within external constraints, to adopt partner 
country procedures, or, where this is not possible, to adopt relevant common proce-
dures. 
— Consult partner governments on the proposed delegated co-operation arrangements. 
— Share the details of delegated co-operation arrangements with partner governments 
and other interested parties, including other donors. 
— Adhere to agreements reached and, in particular, fulfil any agreed consultation re-
porting requirements with other donors. 
For a delegating donor: 
— Assess the policies, systems and procedures of the lead donor where these are impor-
tant to the success of the delegated co-operation arrangement. 
— State clear and realistic expectations of the lead donor in terms of its role in dialogue, 
reporting, monitoring and consultation. 
— Take all opportunities to be flexible, within external constraints, to adopt partner 
country procedures, or, where this is not possible, to adopt relevant common proce-
dures. 
— Consult partner governments on the proposed delegated co-operation arrangements. 
— Share the details of delegated co-operation arrangements with partner governments 
and other interested parties, including other donors. 
— Adhere to agreements reached and, in particular, communicate with a partner gov-
ernment through the lead donor in the areas of responsibility delegated. 
(Source: OECD 2003, 92) 
 
2. Nordic Plus Principles for Delegated Co-operation 
The Nordic Plus countries will (…) strive to work according to the following principles: 
1) Follow the advice in the “Practical Guide” and “Template for Arrangements” on formal 
requirements and practical arrangements that need to be in place in each case of dele-
gated co-operation.  
  
   68 
2) When embarking on delegated co-operation arrangements among Nordic Plus donors 
or with any joining donor, use these documents as common tools to facilitate the im-
plementation. 
3) Base the arrangements on the following key principles, as reflected in the two docu-
ments; 
a) The Lead Donor of the delegated co-operation arrangement will act with authority 
on behalf of one or more Co-Donors in all aspects and all phases of the pro-
gramme or project in question, if no limitations to this is explicitly agreed, 
b) The Lead Donor’s general principles, guidelines and formats for development co-
operation will be used in the follow-up of the programme/project and in the man-
agement of the contributions of the Co-Donor(s),   
c) The Co-Donor(s) will remain “silent” in relation to Partner Government, 
d) The Lead Donor will be responsible for keeping the Co-Donor(s) informed about 
the progress and results of the programme/project. The Co-Donor(s) will in princi-
ple remain “silent”. However the exact arrangement on communication between 
the Lead Donor and the Co-donor(s) will be agreed on a case-by-case basis.  
e) Regarding audit requirements reference is made to the Good Practice Paper devel-
oped by DAC on Financial Reporting and Audit reflecting good practice, responsi-
bilities and roles with regard to audit arrangements. Details on these requirements 
will have to be agreed on a case-by-case basis.  
f) Delegated co-operation arrangements will not involve charging of administrative 
fees, but secondment of staff may be used as an option for sharing the administra-
tive burden of managing delegated cooperation arrangement. 
4) Endeavour to enter into delegated co-operation arrangements with other donors outside 
the Nordic Plus group. This can be done either as a bilateral arrangement between one 
Nordic Plus donor and a new donor, or by an approval by all Nordic Plus donors to ac-
cept a new partner for delegated co-operation arrangements generally. Before entering 
into such arrangement with a new donor on an individual or collective basis the Nordic 
Plus donor(s) will:  
a) Invite the “joining donor” to make an assessment of its policies, administrative 
procedures and financial management requirements, based on the criteria used in 
the “Assessment Matrix” in the “Practical Guide”, annex I and II. The result of 
this assessment should be shared with all Nordic Plus donors.  
b) Based on the assessment of the “joining donor” the Nordic Plus donor or group of 
donors may approve the “joining donor” as a potential partner for delegated co-
operation arrangements.  
5) Encourage donors outside the Nordic Plus group to make use of the delegated co-ope-
ration arrangements, the “practical Guide” with “Assessments Matrix” and the “Tem-
plate for Arrangements” developed by the Nordic Plus donors. 
 
(Source: Nordic Plus Donors 2006) 
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